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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON SOCIAL ISSUES IN EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
By
DANIEL J. LEE
AUGUST, 2016
Committee Chair: Dr. Susan K. Laury
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of three essays, all of which use the toolbox of experimental
methods to explore behavioral issues that fall out of the concepts of human capital and
public economics. The essays examine how an individual alters her behaviors in response to
changes in price, information, and social pressures. Understanding these behavioral changes
can help us to better explore the pathways that can then inform optimal policy design.
The first essay, Racial Bias and the Validity of the Implicit Association Test, examines
Implicit Bias from an economic standpoint. Implicit associations and biases are carried
without awareness of conscious direction. In this paper, I develop a model to study giving
behaviors under conditions of implicit bias. I test this model by implementing a novel
laboratory experiment—a Dictator Game with sorting to study both these giving behaviors,
as well as a subject’s willingness to be exposed to a giving environment. In doing so, I
adapt the Implicit Association Test (IAT), commonplace in other social sciences, for use
in economics experiments. I then compare IAT score to dictator giving and sorting as a
necessary test of its validity. I find that the presence of sorting environments identify a
reluctance to share and negatively predict giving. However, despite the IAT’s ever-growing
popularity, it fails to predict even simple economic behaviors such as dictator giving. These
results are indicative that implicit bias fails to overcome selfish interests and thus the IAT
lacks external validity.
In the second essay, Will Girls be Girls? Risk Taking and Competition in an All-Girls
School my coauthors and I conduct an experiment that tests the effect that all-girl schooling

has on risk taking and competitive behavior. In it, we compare decisions made by students
in an all-girls school to those made by students in a closely matched co-educational school.
We further investigate the developmental nature of this behavior by comparing choices made
by younger students (Grades 7-8) with those of older students (Grades 11-12). By focusing
on the structural differences between those who select into the all-girls’ school, we find that
although girls educated in a single-gender environment are the most risk averse, they are also
among the most competitive. These results lend support to the hypothesis that “nurture
matters” in the gender differences debate.
Finally, I discuss an essay on charitable giving, entitled The Richness of Giving: Charity
Selection and Charitable Gifts in a Large Field Experiment. It builds on previous work in
the charitable giving literature by examining not only how much subjects give to charity,
but also which charities subjects prefer. This choice is operationalized in an artefactual
field experiment with a representative sample of respondents. These data are then used to
structurally model motives for giving. The novelty of this design allows me to ask several
interesting questions regarding the choices one undertakes when deciding both whether and
how much to give to charity. Further, I ask these questions in the context of a standard
utility framework. Given the unique set up of this experiment, I also explore how these
distributional preference parameters differ by charity choice and from what we have observed
in the past. I find that there is more variation within demographics and charity types than
across distributions.
I close with a brief summary and personal reflection.
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Chapter I
Racial Bias and the Validity of the
Implicit Association Test
I.1

Introduction

The Center for American Progress estimates the costs of discrimination at $64 Billion per
year or roughly 2 million annually displaced American workers (Burns, 2012). Discrimination
is clearly costly. It is, almost universally, a unique and puzzling issue. And yet, though its
existence is widely acknowledged, it is rarely discussed publicly. In particular, in Becker’s
(1957) model of taste-based discrimination, animus is not only morally reprehensible, but also
damaging to both social welfare and efficiency as animus necessarily burns money. However,
evidence of animus is rarely observed in either naturally occurring data or field and laboratory
experiments. This is perhaps due to the nature of such experiments, which tend to focus on
non-visceral or unaroused decision making (cold-phase) when intuition dictates that personal
distaste is more likely to be expressed in hotter-phase decisions.
This paper speaks to a recent trend in the social social sciences–the claim that discrimination from animus stems from implicit biases and associations. The concept of implicit
bias suggests that subtle cognitive processes govern our behavior. As a result, implicit biases
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are those that we carry without awareness of conscious direction (Kang, 2009). The development of the Implicit Association Test (IAT henceforth, discussed further below) has lent
support to these claims by introducing a tractable measure of these implicit biases without
having to rely on self-reporting mechanisms, which are known to be unreliable. The IAT
is essentially several timed sorting tasks. In it, subjects match features, such as faces, to
highly and lowly associated attributes, such as good or bad words. Allegedly, it is easier for
an experimental subject to sort any feature with its more closely associated attributes. For
instance, a picture of a chair is more closely associated with a word “furniture” than a word
“food”, and hence more likely to be sorted faster as such. Thus, it is through this primitive
of differential timing that one reveals his or her implicit biases.
There is some common-sense validation to this argument. Frequently cited examples of
these biases in decision making are men being more associated with management or white
faces being more associated with pleasant words and feelings. As economists, we can think
of these biases as coming through on the hot-phase of our decision-making process. However,
to act on these biases in an IAT is costless, and can be thought of as a cheap-talk action.
Furthermore, there has yet to be an in-depth economics experiment to test the validity of
the IAT.
Regardless, meta-analyses seem to illustrate that these biases persist, (Bertrand et al.,
2005; Greenwald et al., 2009) but should we care, and if so, to what extent? The relevant
question isnt merely one of existence, but whether an individual is both willing and able to
act on these biases (e.g. in the case of a giving decision). To quote Dr. James Heckman,
“The authors of these [discrimination] papers focus on the question of whether society is
color blind, not on the specific question of whether there is market discrimination in realized
transactions” (Heckman, 1998).
Given this critique and the damaging effects of bias, we want to know whether a wellfunctioning market can overcome implicit bias, or if it is robust to market interaction. Unfortunately, there appears to be some evidence that implicit bias is robust. For instance, Price
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and Wolfers (2010) claim that, due to the split-second nature of the occupation, implicit
biases can explain their findings of discriminatory behaviors in NBA referees. This behavior
and similar ones suggest a role for the IAT in economic research. What we first need, therefore, is a clean experimental test to see if implicit bias can predict economic behaviors. That
is, is the IAT measuring the bias it claims to, and if so, does that bias influence behavior?
In this paper, I take a necessary first step in this line of research by writing a model
of giving under implicit bias. I then conduct a laboratory experiment that examines the
extent to which these IAT scores co-move with pro-social (giving) behaviors. Additionally,
I allow subjects to sort in and out of giving environments to better identify the biases of
different sharers and how they manifest in the market. I focus on giving behaviors because
of a growing body of work in the social sciences discusses the relationship between bias and
giving behaviors (Triplett, 2012). Furthermore giving behaviors are both non-strategic and
non-spontaneous, and therefore easily controlled by the subject.
This chapter proceeds as follows: The next section provides background on the IAT and
relevant literature. Section 3 describes my model. Section 4 outlines the experiment and
describes the data. Sections 5 through 7 present and discuss the results. A final section
concludes.

I.2
I.2.1

Background
The IAT

Bias cannot be randomly assigned, so the question remains, how can we measure it,
particularly when we may be unaware of the biases we hold? Describing implicit bias as
automatic, and analogizing the mechanics of it to those of a reflex, social psychologists
Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz first claimed to be able to test for it using their Implicit
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Association Test, introduced in 1998. The test is explained in their seminal paper as follows1 :
An implicit association test (IAT) measures differential association of 2 target
concepts with an attribute. The 2 concepts appear in a 2-choice task (e.g., flower
vs. insect names), and the attribute in a 2nd task (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant
words for an evaluation attribute). When instructions oblige highly associated
categories (e.g., flower + pleasant) to share a response key, performance is faster
than when less associated categories (e.g., insect + pleasant) share a key. (Greenwald et al., 1998)
Though screenshots of the IAT tasks are presented in Appendix A, this description merits
further discussion. The reader will note that at its core, the IAT is essentially four (timed)
sorting tasks. The first two tasks, also known as the “2-choice” tasks, are relatively simple,
requiring the subject to sort either concepts or evaluation attributes. In this paper, I utilize
a race (Black-White) IAT which has yet to be used in economics literature, despite the fact
that black-white relations remain one of society’s most divisive issues.
Here, the measure of interest is implicit racial bias. Concepts in the 2-choice task are
pictures of (black and white) faces, while the attributes are are (good and bad) words2 . To
further illustrate, in the 2-choice tasks a subject may be asked to sort black faces on the left
and white faces on the right. Similarly, another 2-choice task would be sorting associated
attributes, in this case sorting good words on one side, and bad words on the other.
The other two stages combine these two sorting tasks in a “shared-response task”. Here
the IAT might say good words AND white faces on the left. In this case either a face or a
word will show up and you sort it accordingly. Then the task flips the association to say good
words AND black faces on the left. This is a key distinction because the test is not eliciting
a matching or opinion from subjects. Rather, this is simply a joint sorting task, designed to
1

It may be difficult to visualize the assessment from this description alone, for further understanding I
recommend visiting Project Implicit R at http://implicit.harvard.edu.
2
examples of good words: Joy, Love, Peace, Wonderful, Pleasure, Glorious, Laughter, Happy; examples
of bad words: Agony, Terrible, Horrible, Nasty, Evil, Awful, Failure, Hurt.
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measure the strength of the association between concept and attribute. While this concept
of associations may seem foreign to economists, it actually finds its roots in early utilitarian
philosophies, wherein people seek not pleasure itself, but rather the objects associated with
those pleasures (Mill, 1869). Table I.1 shows the the progression of IAT tasks.
Table I.1: Progression of IAT Tasks
Stage
Stage 1

Name
Image Stimulus
Learning Trial

Description
In this trial, the custom stimulus
(either images, when present, or
custom words) will be presented
and paired with the response to
either the ’e’ or ’i’ key.

Stage 2

Word Stimulus
Learning Trial

Most IATs that assess preference or
stereotypes use positive or negative
words as the associative stimuli. In
this second trial, these words are
presented.

Stage 3

Paired Test Trial #1

Stage 3 pairs the associations
learned in Stages 1 and 2 and randomly presents a stimulus sampled
from either of those sets of stimuli.

Stage 4

Reverse Image or Word
Stimulus Learning Trial

Stage 4 is identical to Stage 1,
except that the associations are
learned with the opposite hand.

Stage 5

Paired Test Trial #2

Stage 5 combines the associations
learned in Stages 2 and 4.

Source: Meade (2009)

These IAT tasks are conducted at a computer terminal where responses are measured
by keystroke (e.g. E for left, I for right). The testing experience is comparable to a human
player interacting with a computer game. Empirical evidence has shown that the latent
sorting time of black faces and good words in the same column is longer than it is with white
faces and good words.
The standard scoring metric for the IAT is known as the D-Score (Greenwald et al.,
2003). It is similar to Cohen’s measure for effect size, d, and is calculated as the difference
mean latencies within test blocks divided by the standard deviation of latencies across test
5

blocks. For the purposes of IAT scoring only paired trials (stages 3 and 5 in this experiment)
are considered test blocks 3 . The equation for this D-Score is illustrated in equation I.1 below:

D=

x3 − x5
SD3&5

(I.1)

Accordingly, the D-score can be either positive or negative. In the case of a Black-White
IAT, a positive score indicates a positive (automatic) preference for whites, and vice-versa
for a negative score4 . A score of zero indicates little or no preference. The authors further classify and interpret D-scores using the conventional measures for effect size (Cohen,
2013), with break points at ±0.15, 0.35, 0.65 for ‘slight’, ‘moderate’, and ‘strong’ associations,
respectively.
These authors and others have then used the IAT to make several claims. For instance,
these differences in latent sorting speed (and resulting D-scores) are measurements of implicit bias (i.e. the strengths of the associations we hold) and these biases are persistent–with
extant anti-black biases even among minority groups (Nosek et al., 2002)! These are interesting claims, with the benefit that if true, we can observe a personal bias which people may
not know, or may be unwilling to divulge. However, the claims are also dubious. While it is
understandable why the IAT and similar tests use the primitive of timing, we need something
stronger and more applicable in order to draw economic conclusions. As such, I ask what
is the IAT actually measuring? For instance, Norton et al. (2012) suggest not wanting to
appear biased (or wanting to appear race neutral) can cause a “race-paralysis” in this sort
of task.
My critique is twofold, in that questions of both internal and external validity remain
unanswered. Internally, consider the case of someone who may be particularly biased, but
also finds sorting tasks enjoyable. Inversely, consider a subject who is unbiased but maladroit
at sorting. Do we expect this sorting ability (or lack thereof) to offset the time differential?
3

See e.g. table I.1.
My critique notwithstanding, in this paper I will continue to use the terminology of preferences so as to
remain consistent with the literature.
4

6

I formalize this aspect of my critique by adapting the notation of Borghans et al. (2008):

Ti,IAT = hi (fi , Vi )

(I.2)

Let Ti,IAT denote person i’s performance on the IAT task. Output in this task is generated
by an individuals implicit associations, fi , as well as Vi , a vector of other determinants of
task productivity, such as sorting ability.
Now consider, without loss of generality, the case of two individuals, i and j, with
equivalent biases and productivity functions, yet one is better at sorting. That is fi = fj ,
and Vi > Vj , implying differential task performance hi (fi , Vi ) > hj (fi , Vj ) ⇒ Ti,IAT > Tj,IAT .
When we allow for heterogeneity in either the bias or the production function (or both) it
becomes evident that implicit bias remains unidentified.
Further, some may be quick to point out that these subjects are unmotivated. As Grether
and Plott (1979) note, this lack of motivation can be a true cause for concern in the validity
of psychology experiments. However, when the outcome of interest is cheap talk (as in the
IAT), unmotivated subjects may still be valid. The question of interest, which remains to
be answered, is whether or not this IAT cheap talk predicts bias in marketplace behaviors.
That is, is the IAT mapping into economically relevant decisions—is it externally valid? If
so, what are the dosage implications? That is how much more do severe levels of implicit
bias map into these decisions as opposed to moderate or even slight bias?

I.2.2

Literature Review

As such, the true rub lies within the application of this test. Several studies suggest we
should be interested in implicit bias by claiming that it has an effect on economic decisionmaking5 . Again, Price and Wolfers (2010) argue implicit bias explains discriminatory behavior amongst NBA referees, although they do not use an IAT explicitly. Select few studies in
5

For a more thorough review of the recent psychology and management literature regarding the IAT see
Jost et al. (2009).
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economics do. Of them, Lowes et al. (2015) find evidence of ethnic homophily while Reuben
et al. (2014) and Rooth (2010) find predictive evidence of negative hiring conditions. The
former uses an experimental labor market for women in STEM fields, and the latter uses a
correspondence study with an IAT follow-up. It finds that implicitly associated stereotypes
(e.g. Arabs are lazy) forecast interview callbacks in Sweden. However, none of these papers
use a Race IAT, which is the standard and most common. The alleged interaction between
implicit bias and labor market decisions suggests a role for further economic analysis in other
areas of decision-making, such as pro-social behavior.
Thus far, the economic study of bias has primarily dealt with competitive models–those
in which individuals optimize their own behavior. These models date back to Becker (1957)
as well as Phelps and Arrow (1972; 1973, respectively) who developed models relating tastebased (preferential) and statistical (informational) bias, respectively. Since these two models
have different policy implications it is particularly important to properly identify the channels of bias. Briefly, in Becker’s model employers may experience a disutility from hiring
minority workers. Consequently, these workers may have to accept lower wages or similarly
increase productivity to ‘compensate’ employers in-kind for this bias6 . In Arrow’s model
firms have limited information about potential employees and are forced to infer productivity information from primitive observables. In the following discussion, I will talk about
discrimination as resulting from these biases.
In this vein of “primitive observables” our natural inclination as economists to identify the
effects of bias is to plug some outcome of interest (e.g. wages, employment) into a regression
with some likely covariates (e.g. sex, race), control for as many factors as possible, and
interpret the results, or relegate bias to a residual. Comprehensive works by both Yinger
(1998) and Altonji and Blank (1999) review this regression model of identification. The
consensus is that there are markets in which discrimination both exists and is prevalent.
The empirical challenges in these studies, however, are twofold. First, with these reduced6

This does not necessarily imply an absence of discrimination, although with enough unbiased employers,
discrimination can be competed away.
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form models, we cannot identify the causal pathways for this discrimination (such as implicit
cognition). Secondly, the observed outcomes may be severely biased due to missing data.
Charles and Guryan (2011) further critique this regression approach by asking what is the
ideal experiment the regressions are mimicking.
In this sense, a natural solution to these shortcomings is to run experiments. A popular
method in this research has been fictitious tests in the form of either audit or correspondence studies. Both audit studies, which use trained testers (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2012) and
correspondence studies, which use fabricated paper applications (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Hanson and Hawley, 2011; Hanson et al., 2011) provide further evidence of
the existence of discrimination, though they are largely silent on the magnitude of the effect.
In this paper, I help to identify the magnitude (or lack thereof) of any differential treatment.
Furthermore, both audit and correspondence studies have the potential to produce spurious
evidence of discrimination (Neumark, 2012), and are subject to the Heckman (1998) critique
of auditor influence and inferences drawn that are based on otherwise unobservable factors.
These critiques suggest a role for other field and laboratory experiments. Evidence for
bias is consistently found in the field. Furthermore, this evidence is persistent across a widevariety of circumstances and domains, from excessive in-group cooperation amongst kibbutz
members, when compared to Israeli city-dwellers (Ruffle and Sosis, 2006) to Pigouvian price
discrimination amongst sports card traders (List, 2004).
However, laboratory experiments have not yet found significant consensus regarding the
presence of bias, and an open question is the role of implicit bias. Several of these studies use
the methodology of a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM henceforth) public goods
game (Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Solow and Kirkwood,
2002; Castillo and Petrie, 2010). An outstanding issue is that VCM games study group
behavior and are not reflective of the one-on-one interactions of the audit and correspondence
studies described above. Furthermore, laboratory experiments should be more reflective of
the discriminatory practices that we view to be most damaging to society and welfare. In
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this vein we consider experiments that incorporate power asymmetries that a standard VCM
game lacks, to mimic realms where bias is most present.
In response, several studies of note that have used 2-player games to measure discrimination. To study discrimination in culture, Ferraro and Cummings (2007) use the standard
ultimatum game with Hispanic and Navajo subjects in New Mexico. They find significantly
different behavior between the two groups. Furthermore, by eliciting subjective beliefs they
claim these different behaviors are indicative of statistical discrimination. Similarly, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) use a paired design to test for and disentangle channels of discrimination in Israeli society. In their experiment, significantly less money was passed to
male Jews of Eastern origin in a trust game. However, this result was not replicated with a
dictator game, indicating statistical discrimination.
Slonim and Guillen (2010) use the design of a trust game to detect gender discrimination.
Further, to disentangle possible effects they include a treatment that allows for partner
selection. They find (almost) no discrimination without selection but significant taste-based
discrimination with selection. Finally, Eckel and Petrie (2011) use a trust game with a costly
option to see your partner’s picture and find both a demand for pictures, and increased firstmover earnings under pictures.
These 2-player designs allow for much cleaner identification than the group play of a VCM
design, particularly when sorting or selection is used as a treatment cell7 . The problem is this
set of games still involves strategic interactions. Thus, instead of trust or ultimatum, I find
a dictator game (the unique elements of which are described below) to be more appropriate
to studying bias in pro-social behavior. Here, since the second player is passive, any giving
is non-strategic and differences in giving can only be due to discrimination. This is discussed
further in the section on experimental design below. In his review of the dictator game
literature, Camerer (2003) notes that we tend to observe 10-30% of passed endowments.
These rates are problematic if they are only artefactual of the lab, and could be indicative
7

Sorting refers to opting out of playing, whereas selection refers to picking ones partner.
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of experimenter demand effects or privacy concerns.
One check on the observed rates is to allow subjects to sort out of dictator giving, that
is offering dictators a potentially different payoff, $w0 , to not play the dictator game (i.e.
allocate $w). There are three notable papers that address sorting, and thereby motives
for giving. In Dana et al. (2006) one third of subjects opted to take a private $9 payoff
instead of playing a $10 dictator game. Broberg et al. (2007) extend this design by eliciting
a subject’s willingness to pay to exit using a BDM mechanism. They find more subjects are
willing to exit, and for higher prices. Finally, and serving as the inspiration for this design,
Lazear et al. (2012) (LMW henceforth) examine both costly (exit) and subsidized (entrance)
sorting. Using a framework of social preferences, they find that sorting not only affects how
many people share, but also what kinds of people share.
Though not yet used to examine bias, the motives for giving argument and the particulars
of a sorting design apply nicely to this field of inquiry. It is my intent to describe these kinds
of people not only by their giving behaviors, but potentially by their implicit biases as
well. Further, I examine how these biases affect their decisions. This naturally follows from
the behavioral finding that subjects are more likely to opt out of cross-race environments
necessitating a judgment of racial characteristics relevant to common stereotypes (Norton
et al., 2012).
In addition to addressing the above problems, this paper contributes to the literature in
several novel ways. It is the first to examine the psychological pathways of bias by using
the IAT. This is important because as stated above different pathways may have different
economic implications for behavior. This paper is unique in providing racial information of
the recipients and allowing a sorting option with varying property rights in a dictator game.
By comparing the observed rates giving and differential exits to IAT scores, this paper
investigates validity of the IAT in a way the research was previously lacking. Accordingly
the extent of racial bias and the external implications of the test are thereby assessed.
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I.3

Model Description

Assuming the IAT actually measures bias, it should also be able to predict economic
decisions reflecting that bias, such as giving and sorting behaviors. However, the directions
and theory underlying these decisions have not been fully explored. To that end I formalize
a model of giving under implicit bias.
LMW note that different kinds of sharers exist, and introducing a sorting environment
allows us to distinguish between these types, described as follows: Willing Sharers, who
prefer to share and enter into sharing environments; Reluctant Sharers, who prefer not to
share but do so to comply with social pressures, norms, or mores; and Non-Sharers who
simply do not share8 .
In this vein, LMW aim to detect a reluctance to share. I revisit this analysis and extend
the definitions further by examining one potential pathway of this reluctance–conditional on
bias.
For the purposes of this experiment, consider a utility maximizing individual, henceforth
referred to as the dictator. The dictator is indexed by her level of bias, i, which I assume
manifests as animus and perfectly correlates to the dictator’s IAT D-score 9 . The D-score
which is drawn from a standard normal distribution, that is i ∼ N (0, 1)10 . In this model,
the dictator may be in an economic environment that allows sorting, and may also have
photographic information on her receiver. If the former, the dictator can take take up to
two possible actions. First, the sorting decision, that is the decision between allocating an
amount w (sorting in) or receiving an amount w0 (exiting out). Conditional on sorting in,
she must now make the decision of how much to give, that is how to split the endowment w
between herself, x, and the recipient, y, such that x + y = w.
I further hypothesize that individuals also sort based on who they are sharing with, and
8

Formal definitions for these types can be found in Appendix B.
This assumption that the test is registering bias as opposed to cultural knowledge of stereotypes is
consistent with accepted interpretations of the IAT (Nosek and Hansen, 2008).
10
The actual IAT D-score is truncated at -2 and 2, but this does not affect model predictions.
9
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this sorting also manifests itself as animus. As such, I also allow the dictator to consider
the race of the recipient r. This consideration only occurs if the dictator has photographic
information. Thus, the dictator has preferences over her environment D, her payoff, x, the
payoff to the recipient y and the similarity of the race of the recipient r. It is these preferences
that determine sorting or not sorting, and potentially the giving decision:

Ui = Ui (D, x, y, r)

(I.3)

where D is an indicator variable such that D = 1 if the environment has sorting and 0
otherwise; and r is an indicator variable such that r = 1 if the dictator has photographic
information and is the same race as the individual, and 0 otherwise.
Within subjects, the theory of animus dictates that not only is an individual’s utility
greater for an equal amount given to the preferred race11 :

i ≥ 0.15 ⇒ Ui (D, x̄, w − x̄, 1) ≥ Ui (D, x̄, w − x̄, 0)

(I.4)

but also that a person is willing to take a utility hit to express his or her distaste. Here,
that means a willingness to sort out (even if the sort is costly) for the sole purpose of not
sharing:
i ≥ 0.15 ∧ (w < w0 ) ⇒ Ui (1, w0 , 0, 0) > Ui (0, w, 0, 0)

(I.5)

This unwillingness to interact is a core concept of animus. As such, across subjects, the
model of animus predictions that greater bias should have more costly sorting, in addition
to less sharing across races. That is:

11

Ui (D, x̄, w − x̄, 0) > Uj (D, x̄, w − x̄, 0) ⇒ i < j, ∀x̄ < w

(I.6)

w < w0 ⇒ Ui (1, w0 , 0, 0) > Uj (1, w0 , 0, 0), ∀i > j

(I.7)

I have written this model as biased against people of color, but it is trivial to generalize to all racial bias.
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In this experiment, I restrict my focus to the across subject design. Broadly speaking, I
ask two initial empirical questions based on this model. If the answer to either of these first
two questions is yes, it suggests that there is a clear pathway from the the hot-phase IAT
task to some of the cold-phase decisions it has been used to explain. Absent evidence of this
pathway, I ask a final question concerning meta-awareness of bias:
1. Does the IAT predict giving behavior?
2. Does the IAT predict sorting out of giving environments?
3. Do biased givers attempt to mitigate their bias with small gifts?

I.4
I.4.1

Experiment
Procedures

Given that previous lab experiments have demonstrated that these different types of
individuals exist, I ask what are the IAT’s implications for both laboratory and naturally
occurring behavior. I use the toolbox of experimental economics to see if IAT performance is
related to differential treatment of receivers and if so, to what extent. In doing so, I examine
the IAT as a predictor of pro-social behavior in an experimental market. This behavior
includes giving as well as sorting out of potential giving environments.
To properly ask (and answer) these questions this experiment necessarily progresses in
two stages: first the dictator game (potentially with a sorting option), and second with the
IAT. Upon arriving at the lab subjects are randomly split into receivers and dictators. I will
now explain the two roles in turn.
In a standard dictator game, a first mover is given $10 and asked how much she would
like to give to a paired (and passive) player; her choice ends the game. Thus, giving in
this game is non-strategic. I begin with this standard (no information) treatment to gauge
dictator giving without information on the race of the recipient.
14

From here, I differ from a standard game in that some treatments employ a sorting
environment. Specifically, I offer some dictators an exit option as in LMW. In other words,
dictators are given a chance to leave the game in such a way that the passive player never
knows he or she was playing a dictator game. In doing so, I aim to disentangle social pressure
as a motive for giving. This opportunity (choice) can be either costly or free. The costly
option is necessarily payoff dominated by at least one dictator game choice.
Finally, these treatments are run in two types of sessions: Ones with no information
(anonymous), and pictures sessions, where dictators can see who they are passing to, and
use that picture as a proxy for race. For the most part, we are concerned with outcomes in the
“Pictures” sessions. However, the anonymous treatments serve as an interesting comparison
and are necessary for commenting on the social closeness afforded by a picture. Further,
the cross between pictures sessions and sorting treatments allows us to see whether implicit
bias is affecting behavior on either the extensive or intensive margin. That is, the decision
to engage in giving as well as how much to give.
Table I.2: Dictators by Treatment
Sorting
No Information
Pictures
Total

Baseline
20
48
68

Costly
13
68
81

Free
20
59
79

Source: Author’s calculation

As such, this experiment necessitates a 2x3 design. The treatment cells are as follows:
A standard (baseline) dictator game, and two dictator games with sorting: costless and
costly. In costless sorting, the dictator receives the same amount in entry and exit ($10).
In costly sorting, the dictator receives $9 upon exit. These dictator games are all played
across both anonymous and pictured sessions. The treatment cells and number of dictators
that participated in each treatment are described further in table I.2 as well as in the data
section below.
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After roles are assigned, the dictators are randomly paired with a receiver, and in the
Pictures treatments shown a picture of that receiver’s face. The photos serve as a proxy for
race. In the No Information treatments dictators are not informed about their receivers. In
both versions, dictators are then explained the rules of the dictator game. In all but the
baseline treatment, they are asked whether or not they choose to participate. In the event
that a dictator elects to not participate (takes the exit option), their receiver is not given
any information about allocation task, and the dictators are given their exit fee ($9 or $10,
depending on treatment). Otherwise, dictators decide how to allocate a sum of $10 between
themselves and their receiver.
Meanwhile, the receivers are passive in their role. They have their pictures taken, are
guaranteed a show-up fee, and asked to participate in a different task. In this case, that
task is a real-money, 1x risk-preference elicitation (Holt and Laury, 2002), the results of
which I discuss in a companion paper (Lee, in-progress). The receiver task is constant across
treatments.
The next task in the experiment is a race IAT (as described above) on all subjects. I run
this task second because an IAT can possibly influence amounts passed. However, knowing
they have just participated in a dictator game should not influence IAT score, as evidence
shows it is difficult to fake or otherwise manipulate (Fiedler and Bluemke, 2005). I then
close by collecting demographic data in the form of a survey, and pay subjects privately.
Complete subject instructions and survey questions can be found in Appendices C and D,
respectively.

I.4.2

Data

These experiments were conducted during the summer and fall of 2015 at the Center for
Experimental Economics at Georgia State University (ExCEN). Subjects were recruited via
email using the center’s recruiter. While I strove for sessions to be racially balanced, this
was not possible given the makeup of the subject pool. However, I believe this to be non16

Table I.3: Dictator Summary Statistics
Variable
Male
Black
Catholic
Previous Experience
Business or Econ Major
Age
Year in School
GPA

Mean
0.399
0.724
0.092
0.794
0.268
21.775
3.149
3.302

Std. Dev. N
0.491
228
0.448
228
0.29
228
0.405
228
0.444
228
4.838
227
1.07
221
0.448
189

Source: Author’s calculation

problematic given the experimental design, as well as the evidence cited above on implicit
attitudes and minority groups.
Table I.4: Baseline Comparison of Roles in the Experiment
Panel A: χ2 Tests
Covariate
Male
Black
Catholic
Previous Experience
Business or Economics Major
Panel B: Rank-Sum Tests
Covariate
Age
Year in School
GPA

Dictator %
40.08
72.24
9.257
79.29
26.87

Receiver %
51.54
67.84
9.69
76.21
21.59

p-Value
0.014*
0.306
0.873
0.430
0.189

Dictator Mean
21.78
3.15
3.30

Receiver Mean
21.15
3.10
3.26

p-Value
0.216
0.835
0.563

Notes: * Significant at the 5% level
Source: Author’s calculation

Overall, I ran 17 experimental sessions across the 6 treatments, with a roughly equal
balance of subjects across treatment rows12 . In total, 227 dictators (i.e. 454 subjects) participated in the experiment. Table I.3 describes the demographic breakdown of the dictators.
Dictators in this experiment are (on average) 22, with a 3.3 GPA. Roughly 72% are Black
and 40% are Male. Most have previous experience in economics experiments, and the modal
12

Given my power analysis and the fact that receiving in the No-Information treatments is anonymous, I
didn’t require as many subjects.
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Table I.5: Experimental Summary Statistics
Variable
Passed to Male
Passed to Black
Amount Passed
Opted Out (Total)
Opted Out (Costly)
Opted Out (Costless)
IAT D-score

Mean
0.513
0.675
2.692
0.186
.148
0.202
0.054

Std. Dev.
0.501
0.469
2.238
0.389
0.357
0.404
0.495

N
228
228
228
167
81
99
225

Source: Author’s calculation

year in school is senior13 .
Figure I.1: Distribution of Amounts Passed

Source: Author’s illustration

Non-parametric analyses in the form of χ2 and Rank-Sum tests examine covariate balance
between roles. For the most part, I find no significant difference across them, and conclude
13
This is perhaps an artifact of running a summer experiment, where both former juniors and recent grads
identify as seniors.
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that the sample is balanced14 . These results are reported in full in table I.4.
Finally, table I.5 provides a brief description of dictator choices and performance in the
experiment. On average, 27% of the endowment was passed, and a little more than 18% of
those offered an exit option opted out, with more people exiting when it is costless. Rank
Sum tests show sorting significantly decreases sharing, even when sorting is costly (Sorting:
z = 2.146, p < 0.05; Costly Sorting: z = 2.370, p < 0.05). These numbers are roughly
similar to previous findings. Full distributions of amounts passed are illustrated further in
figure I.1.
Figure I.2: Distribution of IAT D-scores

Source: Author’s illustration

14

There were significantly more males in the receiver role (117 as opposed to 91), but this is likely a
byproduct of hypothesis testing across several covariates.
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Regarding the IAT, the average D-score was 0.05, suggesting little to no automatic bias.
I depict these scores in figure I.2 for further exploration. The scores follow a fairly normal
distribution, consistent with both model assumptions and extant results across a variety
of subject pools. The modal score is in the bin 0-0.15 (no automatic bias). However,
there is significant implicit bias in the sample. Over 44% of dictators have an IAT D-score
greater than or equal to 0.15, indicating a pro-white implicit bias. Consonant with the above
evidence, this bias is present and perhaps stronger in subjects identifying as black, with a
mean IAT score of 0.162.

I.5

Discrete Results

We have seen descriptively that sorting environments affect giving behaviors. However,
given the empirical questions asked above, I now turn my focus to the role of the IAT
in making these economic decisions. I first explore this role by simply looking at average
amounts passed, broken up by the dictator’s bias. Specifically, table I.6 shows the mean pass
broken down by both the strength of the association, and the recipient. First of all, these
differences are not significant. Secondly, if implicit bias had a one-to-one mapping into giving
behaviors, we would expect passes to black subjects would get smaller as we move down the
table (strengthen the bias towards whites), and the opposite pattern for whites. However,
these directional patterns do not emerge, particularly in the black recipient column. Here,
those who have dictators biased against them end up earning more on average.
Next, I take what we learned in table I.6 and discretize IAT score into the blunt question
of “do I (implicitly) like or dislike my recipient?”
I express this question in equation I.8:

Outcomei = α0 + β1 (LikeReceiverj ) + β2 (DislikeReceiverj )

(I.8)

Here, I regress an outcome variable on two variables Like and Dislike. The outcome takes
20

Table I.6: Average Amount Passed by IAT score and Race of Receiver
Strength of Implicit Bias
Strong for Blacks
Moderate for Blacks
Slight for Blacks
Little to None
Slight for Whites
Moderate for Whites
Strong for Whites

Black
2.07
2.28
3.43
2.18
3.13
2.47
2.68

Passed to:
White Anonymous
1.67
2.5
2.33
2.75
1.67
2.83
2.55
2.33
3.5
3.33
2.33
2.54
3.33
2.4

Source: Author’s calculation

the form of either a continuous variable representing the percent of endowment shared, or
a binary variable indicating whether a dictator took an exit option. The two variables Like
and Dislike are essentially binary interaction terms defined formally as follows in equation
I.9:

Like =





1 when IAT ≥ 0.15 and Receiver is White





1






0




1




Dislike = 1






0

when IAT ≤ −0.15 and Receiver is Black
otherwise
(I.9)
when IAT ≤ −0.15 and Receiver is White
when IAT ≥ 0.15 and Receiver is Black
otherwise

That is to “like” your receiver means to either hold a pro-white bias and pass to a white
receiver, or hold a pro-black bias and pass to a black receiver. I later decompose the variable
into these two components (pro-white, white receiver and pro-black, black receiver). Similarly, to “dislike” means to have the one of same IAT scores as above, but with the race
of your receiver flipped. Accordingly, the intercept term, α, represents those dictators who
hold little to no implicit bias (−0.15 < IAT < 0.15).
Results from these discrete estimations are presented in table I.7. In the first column we
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Table I.7: Discrete IAT Estimations
VARIABLES
Like Receiver

OLS–Percent Shared
(1)
(2)
0.0696
(0.0469)

Pro-White, White Receiver

-0.578
(0.568)
0.292
(0.358)

0.0291
(0.0492)

Pro-White, Black Receiver
Pro-Black, White Receiver
Constant

0.0783
(0.336)
0.0529
(0.0593)
0.0774
(0.0507)

Pro-Black, Black Receiver
Dislike Receiver

Probit–Opted Out
(3)
(4)

0.229***
(0.0391)

Observations
172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.166
(0.322)
0.0423
(0.0498)
-0.0289
(0.101)
0.229***
(0.0391)

-0.887***
(0.257)

0.0955
(0.337)
0.456
(0.504)
-0.887***
(0.257)

172

126

126

Source: Author’s calculation

find that unbiased givers share about 23% of their endowment, and being biased against (or
in favor of) your receiver does not significantly alter this giving pattern. Furthermore, both
directions of bias remain insignificant when decomposing the Like and Dislike variables into
their respective components in column 2.
Similarly, table I.7, columns 3 and 4 look at how bias influences the probability of opting
out. In both the blunt (column 3) and decomposed (column 4) measures, neither liking nor
disliking one’s receiver has any significant impact on giving.
These results indicate that bias does not affect the decision giving on average. However,
a relevant question is do dictators who are biased against black (white) receivers behave
differently than the average dictator with a black (white) receiver. To answer this question,
I conduct an exercise similar to the one outlined in equation I.8, but restrict the sample
based on race of receiver and only regress on the Dislike variable.
22

Table I.8: Discrete Estimations, Conditional on Race of Receiver
VARIABLES
Dislike Receiver
Constant

Black Receiver
(OLS) (Probit)
-0.00310
(0.0407)
0.274***
(0.0267)

-0.132
(0.290)
-0.659***
(0.191)

Observations
127
93
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

White Receiver
(OLS) (Probit)
-0.0727
(0.100)
0.273***
(0.0381)

0.952*
(0.576)
-1.383***
(0.374)

45

33

Source: Author’s calculation

Even when we isolate the sample by race of receiver, biased dictators are not behaving
in ways that are not statistically different than the average dictator, nor is this difference
economically significant. While the above results are indicative that implicit bias fails to
overcome selfish concerns, they have mostly examined the effect of IAT score on economic
behaviors. Another way of looking at the question is to treat the data as observational, and
ask (with some abuse of notation) what is the treatment effect of being paired with someone
you hold a bias against?
To answer this question I exploit the random assignment of roles and partners and implement propensity score matching. Here, I treat each person as having a particular bias
strength and direction, ranging from strongly pro-black to strongly pro-white (e.g. see table
I.6). I match on the strength and direction of this bias as well as covariates describing the
dictator’s age, race, and sex, and specify the treatment as passing to someone you hold a
bias against. That is, passing to a black person if you hold a pro-white bias and vice-versa. I
find no significant treatment effect of passing to someone you are biased against (ATT=0.14,
p=0.625 ).
Result 1 Existence of bias towards receiver does not predict dictator giving
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I.6

Continuous Results

However, we measure IAT score as a continuous variable, and are able to comment not
only on the existence of implicit bias, but also the strength of that bias. As such, one
would think that more severe biases would exert more influence on the giving and sorting
decisions. To address this dosage question, I standardize the IAT score and outline the
following reduced form empirical specification:
Outcomei = β0 + β1 IATi + β2 (IATi ∗ Racej ) + β 0 X + εi

(I.10)

This standardization allows me to interpret coefficients as the effect of a one standard deviation increase in IAT score. In this specification I again regress an outcome variable on
two variables of interest: that dictator’s IAT score and an interaction term of dictator’s IAT
score with the race of her recipient, as well as a vector of demographic controls for both
dictators and receivers. The interaction term allows us to examine this giving conditional on
being paired with the object of one’s bias. This interaction is also consistent with the model
assumption that the IAT manifests as animus. The controls are necessary because observed
differences in the outcome variable may be driven by factors unrelated to a dictator’s implicit
bias. Different specifications below may highlight different sets of these parameters in my
analysis.

I.6.1

Dictator Giving

I continue with a graphical exploration of the IAT’s relationship to giving. Figure I.3
shows the amount passed given a dictator’s IAT score. Despite the IAT’s popularity in
academic work, there is no clear linear relationship between IAT score and amount passed
(ρ = −0.01). Further, in each “column” of IAT score there appears to be a similar bimodal
distribution of amount passed. This suggests that levels of implicit bias do not necessarily
map into the behaviors of interest.
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Figure I.3: Scatter Plot of IAT Score and Amount Passed

Notes: The solid line indicates the IAT-D ”bias” threshold of 0.15
Source: Author’s illustration

To confirm these findings econometrically, we turn to table I.9 which presents this paper’s
main estimates. In these models I restrict the sample to only the dictators in sessions with
photographs, although the results hold when expanded to the full sample. Additionally, I
have used both dictator and receiver dummies for African-American, rather than which race
a subject is biased against. While this may be a coarse measure, this modeling technique
makes more sense in terms of coefficient interpretation since IAT score is increasing in the
level of anti-black bias. Further, these results are consistent with the discrete estimations
from section V and robust to the alternate specification of “biased against receiver”15 .
In panel A of table I.9 I start with a simple OLS and regress percent shared on the
15

See, for instance, tables I.7 and I.13.
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parameters of interest. We see that neither implicit bias nor its interaction with a black
receiver yields a significant predictor of giving. These results hold true in specifications that
control for race and gender of dictator, the receiver, and both. Further, these controls also
have no significant effect on giving.
However, the presence of a sorting option consistently and significantly decreases the
amount shared by around 10%. This result suggests that in terms of giving behaviors,
people aren’t acting on their implicit biases, and perhaps are able to control any bias they
may hold. Instead, social preferences unrelated to the IAT, especially pressure to give,
appear to be strongly influencing these pro-social behaviors (or lack thereof).
Next, to account for the 27% of dictators who either gave nothing or opted out, I replicate
the OLS results with a left-censored Tobit model16 . These results are shown in table I.9,
panel B, and are not categorically different than the OLS results. That is, IAT score is
positive but insignificant, the interaction term is negative but not significant, controls lack
significance, and the presence of a sorting option is strongly and negatively significant.
Following LMW, I assess the determinants of sharing in table I.10. Specifically, I compare
the relative importance of implicit bias (in column 1) to the presence of the sorting option,
as well as self-reported demographics that could potentially affect sharing (in column two).
Again, one’s amount of implicit bias does not significantly determine sharing. Magnitudes
of these results are similar when I run the full model, including IAT score with demographic
controls (column 3). Additionally, I calculate coefficients of partial determination17 . This
measure shows that not only does implicit bias lack statistical significance, but one’s IAT
score accounts for less than 4% of the unexplained variance and lacks economic significance
as well.
The above exercises hold true when instead of looking at the coarse measure of race of
receiver, I look at the finer measure of being biased against one’s receiver. In figure I.4, I
16

Robust standard errors are calculated using jackknife estimation. A double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971)
would be inappropriate here because to account separately for the opt-out process requires restricting the
sample to only those in sessions with sorting. Results from this model are presented in Appendix E.
17
(R2 − Ri2 )/(1 − Ri2 ) where Ri2 is the R2 with predictor i removed from the equation.
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Figure I.4: Sharing When Dictator is Biased
(a) Whole Sample

(b) Conditional on Staying In

Source: Author’s illustration
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Table I.9: The IAT’s Effect on Percent Shared
Panel A: OLS
Variable
IAT D-score
IATxPassedBlack

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.0197
(0.0353)
-0.0617
(0.0805)

0.0169
(0.0351)
-0.0439
(0.0795)
-0.101***
(0.0355)

0.0286
(0.0450)
-0.0494
(0.0797)
-0.0960***
(0.0368)
X

0.0262
(0.0385)
-0.0595
(0.0867)
-0.0944***
(0.0361)

0.0389
(0.0366)
-0.0665
(0.0843)
-0.0867**
(0.0377)
X
X
0.382***
(0.0641)

Sorting Option
Dictator Controls
Receiver Controls
Constant

0.269***
(0.0176)

0.343***
(0.0278)

0.388***
(0.0509)

X
0.339***
(0.0460)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.0298
(0.0485)
-0.0854
(0.110)

0.0251
(0.0481)
-0.0574
(0.109)
-0.145***
(0.0448)

0.0361
(0.0483)
-0.0632
(0.109)
-0.138***
(0.0462)
X

0.0426
(0.0535)
-0.0883
(0.120)
-0.132***
(0.0452)

0.0549
(0.0516)
-0.0959
(0.117)
-0.122**
(0.0469)
X
X
(0.0495)
0.359***
(0.0849)
172

Panel B: Tobit
Variable
IAT D-Score
IATxPassedBlack
Sorting Option
Dictator Controls
Receiver Controls
Constant

0.222*** 0.327***
(0.0254) (0.0336)
Observations
172
172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.366***
(0.0688)
172

X
(0.0478)
0.323***
(0.0576)
172

Source: Author’s calculation

graph box plots for a further analysis of what happens when a dictator is biased against the
race of his or her receiver. For these figures that means both passing to a black receiver when
biased against blacks (Receiver = Black|IAT ≥ 0.15) as well as passing to a white receiver
when biased against whites (Receiver = Black|IAT ≤ −0.15).
Clearly there is no difference in giving when I consider the whole sample in figure I.4a.
But, this result also holds when I consider only those dictators who did not take an exit
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Table I.10: Determinants of Sharing
Variable
IAT D-score

(1)

(2)

-0.00247
(0.0169)

Sorting Option

-0.0847**
(0.0423)
Age
0.00642***
(0.00245)
Male
0.00345
(0.0407)
Black
-0.0992*
(0.0502)
Catholic
-0.000280
(0.0708)
Previous Experience
-0.0258
(0.0466)
Major: Business or Econ
0.00407
(0.0420)
GPA
-0.112***
(0.0409)
Constant
0.268*** 0.657***
(0.0176)
(0.164)
Observations
172
146
R-squared
0.000
0.138
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
0.00850
(0.0195)
-0.0830*
(0.0448)
0.00614**
(0.00253)
-0.00223
(0.0426)
-0.107**
(0.0519)
0.00947
(0.0761)
-0.0277
(0.0468)
0.00614
(0.0429)
-0.110***
(0.0411)
0.659***
(0.164)
143
0.136

Partial
R2 ’s

0.036
0.158
0.148
0.005
0.185
0.012
0.047
0.012
0.219

Source: Author’s calculation

option in figure I.4b. We will see a similar result regarding dictators choosing to opt out in
the following subsection on Dictator Sorting.
Finally, I compare the picture treatments to the anonymous ones. Using rank-sum tests,
amounts given by the dictator do not appear to be different across these two treatment rows
(z = −0.039, p = 0.969). This holds when we ignore baseline treatments and consider only
those with a sorting option (z = −1.268, p = 0.205), or restrict the sample to dictators
paired with the object of their bias (z = −0.863, p = 0.388). Since a dictator cannot see his
or her receiver in the anonymous treatments, it is unlikely that implicit racial bias comes
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into play in this sharing decision. The lack of difference between the two treatment rows
here is further indicative of the null results above.
Given the overwhelming evidence above, I now declare the first result, regarding implicit
bias and dictator giving:
Result 2 Amount of Implicit Bias (as indicated by IAT D-score) does not predict dictator
giving

I.6.2

Dictator Sorting
Figure I.5: Bar Graph of IAT Scores and Sorting

Notes: The solid line indicates the IAT-D ”bias” threshold of 0.15
Source: Author’s illustration

Perhaps the above results are indicative that biased dictators are forward thinking with
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regard to these biases or otherwise self-aware enough to recognize their biases. If so, they may
be simply choosing not to enter sharing environments where they can express this distaste,
or similarly choosing to express this distaste through their opt-out. However, we see in figure
I.5 the average IAT score for dictators in treatments with an exit option. Under costly and
costless sorting schemes, the mean IAT score is descriptively smaller amongst those who
stay in (as compared to those who opt out), whereas in costless sorting the mean IAT score
is essentially the same. However, in both cases, this difference is not significant (Costly:
t = 1.04, p = 0.30; Costless: t = 0.03, p = 0.98).
Accordingly, I estimate the probability of opting out in table I.11. This model uses a
probit regression and necessarily restricts the sample to only those dictators with an exit
option (that is, those in sorting treatments, n=159,). The variable structure is intended to
mimic the experimental design, using dummy variables for treatment and a measurement
variable to indicate IAT score. In this model, there are no significant coefficients, suggesting
that overall, one’s IAT score does not seem to influence the decision to sort out, with this
result holding even when controlling for both the financial and social costs of sorting.
Nonetheless, this exploration again calls for a deeper analysis. Following equation I.10 I
look at the econometric results to confirm. In this case I ignore the anonymous treatments
(n = 127) and run probit estimations to determine what effect (if any) IAT score has on
the probability of opting out. Table I.12 shows the marginal effects of these estimations.
Consistent with the results above, the IAT has no significant effect on sorting. This holds
when I control for whether the sorting is costly and for race and gender of the dictator,
receiver, and both. Similar to the analysis under dictator giving, the signs of these coefficients
are also unexpected. We see that more biased dictators opt out less. Specifically, an increase
in IAT score by 1 standard deviation leads to roughly an 11% smaller chance of opting out.
As a check, I examine what happens to sorting when a dictator is biased against the race
of his or her receiver (n = 75). In this case I draw a bar graph in figure I.6. Confirming the
results above, there is no evidence that bias has an effect on sorting, even when the dictator

31

Table I.11: The Probability of Opting Out
Probit Regression
Variable

Coefficient

IAT D-score

-0.095
(0.114)
Costless Sorting (Pictures)
0.369
(0.253)
Costly Sorting (Anonymous)
-0.463
(0.547)
Costless Sorting (Anonymous)
0.116
(0.370)
Constant
-0.976***
(0.184)
Observations
159
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculation

Table I.12: The IAT’s Effect on Sorting
Probit Marginal Effects
Variable
IAT D-score

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.114
(0.0727)
0.234
(0.175)

-0.105
-0.108
-0.111
-0.115
(0.0744) (0.0814) (0.0871) (0.0933)
IATxPassedBlack
0.206
0.214
0.201
0.207
(0.177) (0.185) (0.194) (0.202)
Costly Sorting
-0.0949 -0.0977 -0.0960
-0.102
(0.0731) (0.0730) (0.0721) (0.0722)
Dicator Controls
X
X
Receiver Controls
X
X
Observations
126
126
126
126
126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculation

holds an implicit bias against the receiver’s race.
Finally, we extend the cross-treatment exercise from above and compare anonymous
sorting to sorting when photo information is present, by way of Pearson’s test. Again, there is
no statistical difference between opting out in the two treatment rows (χ2 = 0.611, p = 0.434).
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This holds in costly sorting
Figure I.6: Sorting When Dictator is Biased

Source: Author’s illustration

(χ2 = 0.623, p = 0.430), and when passing to someone who’s race you are biased against
(χ2 = 0.707, p = 0.400), As such it is also unlikely that implicit bias is influencing giving on
the extensive margin, inclusive of sorting decisions.
Result 3 Amount of Implicit Bias (as indicated by IAT D-score) does not predict sorting
in or out of the dictator game
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I.7

Small Gifts, a Robustness Check

Thus far, I have suggested that the IAT does not predict giving or sorting behaviors.
However, I have also left the door open for dictators to have awareness of their biases, metacognitive abilities with respect to it, or both. This may suggest that differences in giving
are more subtle than the ones suggested above. For instance, what if biased dictators are
giving, but their giving is concentrated in small(er) gifts?
To test for this concentration, I utilize the Dislike variable from equation I.9 above,
noting that this variable highlights cases of both pro-white and anti-white bias. I also
generate dummy variables for various small gift amounts. I then run Pearson’s χ2 tests to
see if giving in those small amounts is different for biased and non-biased dictators in each
of the pictures treatments. Full results from these tests are depicted in table I.13.
Table I.13: The IAT and Small Gifts
p-value for Gift Size:
0
≤1
≤2
N
No Sorting
0.738 0.209
0.369
48
Sorting
0.646 0.319
0.968
127
Receiver is Black
0.367 0.256
0.647
130
Sorting & Receiver is Black 0.310 0.181
0.753
94
Whole Sample
0.927 0.893
0.496
175
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Author’s calculation

Small giving is not different between biased and unbiased dictators in every specification.
This result suggests that biased giving is not concentrated in small giving, and lends further
credence to the above discussion of dictator giving as a whole.
Result 4 Biased givers are no more likely to give small (≤ $2) gifts
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I.8

Conclusion

Racial bias is a persistent concern in the social sciences. In the past two decades, a
proposed method of detecting it, the Implicit Association Test, has caught fire amongst the
academics who study bias. At the time of this writing, the IAT’s original paper has over 6600
citations, with researchers claiming it has implications on all sorts of economic outcomes,
from workplace discrimination and managerial behavior, to egalitarian ideals and general
social welfare. Yet, economists have only recently started to explore these claims in detail.
In this paper I have undertaken an in-depth examination of one of those claims in
particular—that implicit (racial) bias is a predictor of pro-social behavior. I focused on
these behaviors due to a growing literature suggesting the importance of the relationship
between bias and pro-sociality. In doing so, I critique the extant literature stemming from
the IAT. I then write a model of giving under conditions of implicit bias and conduct a
laboratory experiment to test those model predictions.
Specifically, I test biased giving using a dictator game where acts of giving are both nonstrategic and non-spontaneous, and therefore easily controlled (by the subject). Additionally,
in some treatments I include a sorting (exit) option to see if biased givers simply choose to
avoid the potential giving transactions altogether.
I find that, contrary to model predictions and previous literature, implicit bias fails to
predict giving on both the extensive and intensive margins. That is, not only does implicit
bias not predict amounts shared in the dictator game, it also does not predict examples of
zero sharing, or the choice to exit a giving environments. Furthermore, these results hold not
only in fine bins of analysis, but also wider and more powerful ones, such as when I restrict
my sample to small gifts, or dictators paired with receivers of the race they hold implicit
biases against.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to explore the implications of a
Race IAT in an economics experiment. As such, the analysis in this paper represents a
necessary step forward in this line of research that previously consisted of fascinating, but
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unsubstantiated claims.
The dictator game is a compelling example in that it consists of a very simple economic
decision. If the IAT fails to map into this class of cold-phase decisions, what are the implications for decisions which may be more complex but also require more deliberation, such
as hiring?
However, more research is needed as the dictator game is also a very clear-cut decision,
and perhaps the IAT could be better used to predict maps into so-called fuzzier or multi-level
economic decisions, decisions made in groups or ones where the use of heuristics have been
shown to play a prominent role.
In this vein, we might think of implicit bias as mapping into a spectrum of pro-social
activities with dictator giving at one end of the spectrum and a potentially different result
at the other. If this is true, then future field experiments could prove to be a fruitful area of
research.
Finally, as the popularity of the IAT grows in academia, so does its use in the public
domain. As such, this paper also speaks to policy in general, and jurisprudence in particular.
The typical anti-discrimination statute requires proof that harmful actions were “because
of” discrimination. More and more, implicit bias is being recognized as a source of this
liability. For instance, in a recent Supreme Court case regarding the Fair Housing Act, Chief
Justice Roberts wrote for the majority that:
Recognition of disparate impact liability under the FHA also plays a role in
uncovering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment. In this way disparate-impact liability may prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping.
(Texas DoH v. ICP Inc., 2015)
Italics are my own. This means that bias is classified under the law as resulting in differential
treatment even if one is not aware of the held bias, as in an implicit bias. And hence, we
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need further explorations of implicit bias and its potential to map into this sort of decision
making, else we could be establishing ineffective policies.

37

Chapter II
Will Girls be Girls?
Risk Taking and Competition in an All-Girls School

II.1

Introduction

At the time of this writing, there are only 21 female CEOs in the S&P 500, and it is
well known that this sort of vertical gender segregation exists throughout the labor market1 .
Despite enormous amounts of research on the gender gap for both wages and positions, the
underlying reasons for this disparity remain unclear. However, one oft-cited explanation is
a basic difference in risk preferences and/or the willingness to compete (Johnson and Powell
1994; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007). This hypothesis suggests that women, either naturally
or through institutional environments, such as schools, develop skills not suited for upper
management.
In this paper, we follow a promising course of literature in this area, which focuses on
these differences and seeks to disentangle innate and immutable causes from those that are
the products of our environments—the so-called “nature-or-nurture debate”. In short, men
and women tend to have different emotional responses to risk and also possess differing levels
of confidence. The emotional responses are most likely hardwired (“nature”) whereas the
confidence levels may be a result of “nurture”.
1

Catalyst, Inc. Knowledge Center (http:// http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-ceos-sp-500).
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Given the profound amounts spent on education (over $600 Billion annually, almost 4%
of US GDP), we choose to examine this debate in the context of gender-specific peer effects,
by running an experiment in two closely matched, yet distinct educational environments—
co-ed and single sex schools. Specifically, we study the risk taking and competitive behavior
of girls educated in closely matched singer-gender and co-educational environments.
Of course it is extremely difficult to tease apart and isolate these factors, especially absent random assignment. To do so, we structurally estimate risk preference parameters, and
directly include these preferences when estimating the decision to compete. We also examine the developmental and formative components of these behaviors by comparing middle
school students (grades 7 and 8) with upper school students (Grades 11 and 12), and by
including the respective co-educational boys in our analysis. Further, we study the structural differences that exist between families choosing to send their daughters to a single sex
school as opposed to a co-educational one that has a similar mission. Consistent with the
above hypothesis, we find that though girls educated at a single-gender school are among the
most risk averse, they are also the most competitive—comparable in competitive behaviors
to their male counterparts.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the relevant literature informing our research. Section three outlines our experimental design. Section four describes
our data and hypotheses. Section five describes and interprets our results and is followed by
a concluding final section.

II.2

Literature Review

This paper follows from a long line of research disentangling the roles of nature and
nurture in the gender gap for wages and occupations. Polachek (1981) argues that the gender
gap is due to differences in abilities and preferences that result in occupational self-selection.
This hypothesis echoes concerns laid out in Heckman (1979). The higher intermittency rate

39

of women in the workforce can be used to explain the gender gap. Further, the apparent
lack of women in the upper tiers of corporate management may be indicative that as a
group they are less willing to make the risky decisions that are necessitated in the corporate
world (Johnson and Powell, 1994). Similarly, Flory et al. (2015) find women shy away from
applying to jobs with competitive payment schemes.
These preference-based arguments rely on previously unidentified utility parameters, suggesting a role for both the toolbox of experimental economics and richer data within those
experiments. In their review of the experimental literature, Croson and Gneezy (2009) find
that, in general, women tend to be more risk averse than men—a view consistent with conventional findings in psychology2 . Further, they find that men are more likely than women
to compete and that male performance levels increase more than female levels when under
competition.
Though men are generally more likely to compete, Gneezy et al. (2003) use different
incentive schemes and find that the performance of women in single sex tournaments is
higher than in the non-competitive treatment. Further studies show women competing as
much as men, given large enough rewards (Petrie and Segal, 2014). Thus, there are instances
in which women will perform in a competitive environment, however these results focus on
tournament entry without controlling for risk attitude. In a similar experiment, Datta Gupta
et al. (2013) find that men select the tournament choice more often than women and that a
woman’s degree of risk aversion influences her decision to select the tournament (as opposed
to a non-competitive piece-rate compensation scheme). Their experiment differs from Gneezy
et al. (2003) in two key ways. First, they increase the incentives to compete, and second, they
allow subjects to select their competitor. They find that participation in the tournament
increases with the higher incentive scheme and that the gender gap is reduced when the
subjects can choose their competitor3 . These findings suggest a need for joint estimation.
2

See Campbell (2002) for a review of these findings.
For a more comprehensive view of the recent literature on the gender differences in competition, we
suggest Niederle and Vesterlund (2011).
3
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Given these observed differences, an outstanding question is what drives these differences
in competition rates? Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) suggest a major channel is differences
in confidence, with men over-competing and women shying away from competition. However,
this difference is not inherently universal as Gneezy et al. (2009) observe female competition
in a matrilineal society far exceeds that in a patriarchal one. This suggests that decreased
competitive behavior may not be intrinsic to female nature, but rather elected by subjects
due to familial and societal nurturing. We can also understand nurture to be institutional,
such as in Leibbrandt and List (2014) where simple changes in job postings can eliminate
the gender gap in wage negotiations.
Given the demonstrations that (1) nurture matters and (2) can affect the later life outcomes, early-life experiments provide an ideal testing ground for these theories. Cárdenas
et al. (2012) vary the competitive task and find no gender differences in Colombia, with
mixed results in Sweden. While in Austria, Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler (2015) find young
boys consistently prefer to compete, and this preference persists throughout adolescence.
Furthermore, educational environments and interventions allow us to study the roles
of gender-peer effects. For instance, Fryer and Levitt (2010) note that there is no gender
gap for mathematics in kindergarten, yet after six years girls perform worse than their
male counterparts. However, a growing body of field and natural experiments suggests that
single sex schooling can improve student performance, be it math skills and self-confidence
(Eisenkopf et al., 2015) test scores and college attendance (Park et al., 2013), or grades and
pass rates (Booth et al., 2014). However, Oosterbeek and Van Ewijk (2014) do not find
strong gender effects on performance when the unit of treatment is an economics workgroup.
In the U.K. Booth and Nolen (2012a; 2012b) separately examine risk taking and competitive behaviors of students in single sex schools. Using a one-shot gamble for the risk
task and a choice of payment scheme in the competition paper, their results indicate that
girls from single gender schools behaved closer to boys from co-ed and single gender schools
than girls from co-ed schools. However, only those students who sat for the 11+ exam were
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eligible for being placed in a single sex school, and perhaps more importantly, their parents
needed to be willing to have them sit for the 11+ exam, suggesting the need for further
research4 .
In this vein, our paper continues and extends the line of research on the gender peereffects of risk taking and competitive behaviors. Specifically, we revisit the question of
single sex schooling as a mechanism to increase tournament entry using subjects from two
closely matched American schools (one single sex and one co-educational)5 . By structurally
estimating a CRRA utility function, we extend previous examinations of risk-preference by
also studying the distribution of preference parameters in our data. Further, we include
these risk attitudes directly when estimating competitive behavior. Finally, we contribute
to the literature by considering the role adolescent development has on these behaviors by
including both middle school students and late secondary students from both schools in our
analysis.

II.3

Experimental Procedures

To investigate the risk taking and competitive behaviors of young women we utilized two
financially incentivized tasks henceforth referred to as the risk task and the competition task,
respectively. The subjects were informed that they would be paid based on their performance
in the tasks, and that only one task would be selected for payment. In order to study
these behaviors in the context of gender peer-effects and education, the experiments were
conducted using students in middle school (7th and 8th grade) and late secondary education
(11th and 12th graders) at two different, yet closely matched academic institutions.
In the risk task, we follow a Holt and Laury (2002) style multiple price list design to
elicit a subject’s risk attitude. In it, a subject makes choices over a series of ten gambles.
4

http://www.elevenplusexams.co.uk/advice/what-is-11-plus.
The schools selected for our analysis serve identical educational markets and have common mission
statements. Therefore, these two schools closely compete for applicants and the only major difference is that
one is a single sex school and the other is not.
5
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Each gamble consists of a choice over two simple lotteries, one being relatively “riskier” than
the other. The ‘safe’ lottery can produce earnings of either $8.00 or $6.40; while the ‘risky’
lottery can produce earnings of either $15.40 or $0.40 (these payments are 4x the baseline
levels used in Holt and Laury, 2002). The gambles were presented in order, starting from
winning the low prize with certainty, and decreasing that probability 10% for each successive
gamble (so in the last gamble, there was a 90 percent chance of the higher-payoff outcome
and a 10% chance of the lower-payoff outcome). A subject switching to the ‘risky’ lottery
relatively sooner indicates a lower degree of risk-aversion. To assist with the probabilities,
subjects were presented with gambles on successive sheets of paper displaying the gambles
numerically (with probabilities expressed in terms of the throw of a 10-sided die) and also
graphically (as pie charts). Examples of these risk decision sheets are in appendix F. For the
purposes of this experiment we assume a CRRA utility function and structurally estimate
the risk parameter, ρ, in a fashion similar to Andersen et al. (2008).
We choose to measure competitiveness as a self-selection into a competitive setting.
Specifically, our competition task elicits a subject’s willingness to compete following Gneezy
et al. (2009). In it, each subject is randomly assigned a member of his or her session as a
competitor and given ten chances to lob a tennis ball underhand into a bucket from three
yards away and paid based on his or her performance in this task. Subjects are told that the
assignments were determined before the session, and that they would not be told who they
are paired with in the experiment. However, they can observe the other subjects in their
group. Since these assignments are pre-determined the person they are competing against
could have chosen either payment method, and assignments are not commutative. That is,
the person you are competing against is not necessarily competing against you, let alone
competing at all. Before beginning to lob, each individual subject must select a preferred
payment scheme—which is either “piece-rate” or “competitive”.
The performance of one’s competitor is immaterial for the piece-rate scheme. Subjects
are simply paid $2 for each successful lob (meaning the ball was thrown inside of the bucket).
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However in the competitive payment scheme, subjects are paid $0 if they fail to lob more
than their competitor; if they lob more than their competitor, they are paid $8 for each
successful ball that exceeds their competitor’s number of successful lobs. For example, if a
subject elects to compete and successfully lobs 4 balls, while her competitor successfully lobs
2 balls, she earns $16. On the other hand, if she had only lobbed 1 ball in the bucket, she
earns nothing. Ties are paid $0 and negative earnings are not permitted.
Paper instructions are given to subjects, and read out loud to all participants in the
session. After completing the competition task, we randomly selected which task is chosen
for payment by way of a coin flip. All payments were made to subjects in the form of gift
cards to either Starbucks or Chick-Fil-A fast-food restaurant (subjects chose which they
preferred to receive). After all tasks were completed subjects filled out a short demographic
questionnaire. Complete subject instructions as well as the questionnaire can be found in
appendix F.
In many of the previous experimental studies of gender and education, there have been
obvious sample selection issues. Ours is not unique in this respect. However, gender differences aside, the schools were chosen based on similar mission statements and the respective
educational markets they serve. Furthermore, we are the first to undertake an experimental
study of risk and competition within a United States single sex institution. While our confidentiality agreement with the schools prohibits us from naming the schools, the similarities
in the two institutions lead us to believe, a priori, that observed differences in choices will
be due to nurture rather than nature. That is, they arise from the differences in the schooling environments, parenting, and peer influences. Therefore, our study is on the structural
differences that exist between families that elect to send their daughters to private single
sex school versus an alternate private co-ed school with a similar mission. While we are not
able to precisely isolate the mechanism that generates the differences observed, our results
are informative to the debate surrounding these preference parameters and gender. In the
next section we discuss this selection argument further.
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II.4

Data
Table II.1: Number of Subjects

Middle School (Grades 7-8)
Upper School (Grades 11-12)
Total

Females
(SS)
80
42
122

Females
(CE)
25
56
81

Males
(CE) Total
40
145
34
132
74
277

Our experimental subjects were housed in the middle and upper grades of their schools.
Table II.1 describes the breakdown of experimental subjects by school and grade level. Overall, 277 students participated in the experiment, with a roughly equal split between upper
schools and middle schools. 44% of the subjects attended the SS (Single sex) school, and
boys comprised 47.7% of the CE (Co-ed) subjects, and 26% of the sample in all.
As part of the experiment, we aimed to demonstrate the demographic closeness of these
schools. Publicly available data from the National Center for Education Statistics are shown
in Figure II.1. While the SS school serves a higher percentage of students of color, they are
otherwise strikingly similar, particularly with respect to the universe of private education as
a whole.
Table II.2: Summary Statistics—Sports Participation
Panel A: Grades 7-8
Females
Females
Males
Plays in a:
(SS)
(CE)
(CE)
Team Sport
0.75 (0.43) 0.72 (0.46) 0.5 (0.42)
Hand-Eye Sport
0.71 (0.46) 0.72 (0.46) 0.8 (0.41)
Lettering Sport
0.86 (0.35) 0.88 (0.34) 0.88 (0.34)
Panel B: Grades 11-12
Females
Females
Males
Plays in a:
(SS)
(CE)
(CE)
Team Sport
0.53 (0.50) 0.34 (0.48) 0.38 (0.49)
Hand-Eye Sport
0.56 (0.50) 0.43 (0.5) 0.35 (0.49)
Lettering Sport
0.73 (0.45) 0.57 (0.5) 0.59 (0.5)
Notes: Presented as difference in mean with standard deviation in parentheses

Additionally, we gathered data on sports participation, educational attainment, and fam45

Figure II.1: Demographic Comparison of SS and CE Schools

Source: National Center for Education Statistics

ily environment within these schools. These data not only serve to help us test hypotheses
relating to risk and competition (described below), but also further illustrate the demographic similarities of the schools. Table II.2 provides descriptive statistics on the rates of
sports participation among subjects. As shown in the table, participation rates appear equal
within age groups regardless of gender of school. Participation hovers around 75% in middle
school, but begins to diverge as the children get older, presumably because older children
have access to a greater array of extracurricular activities.
In fact, we illustrate this closeness by failing to reject the hypothesis that team sport
participation differs between schools in either the middle school or upper school test groups
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(Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.93, p = 0.22, respectively). However, we can conclude that
participation in team sports decreases across the two age groups (Pearson’s χ2 , p = 0.00)6 .
Table II.3: Summary Statistics—Educational Attainment
Panel A: Grades 7-8
Females
Variable:
(SS)
HW hours/night
2.02 (1.24)
Math test hours
2.23 (7.25)
Highest math class
2.58 (.522)
# of AP classes
0.05 (0.28)
# of AP Math/Sci
0.00 (0)
Panel B: Grades 11-12
Females
Variable:
(SS)
HW hours/night
2.53 (1.09)
Math test hours
2.02 (4.52)
Highest math class
6.09 (1.14)
# of AP classes
2.2 (2.08)
# of AP Math/Sci
0.84 (1.1)

Females
Males
(CE)
(CE)
1.69 (0.79) 1.43 (0.98)
1.70 (1.22) 1.22 (1.2)
2.56 (0.51) 2.83 (0.75)
0.04 (0.2) 0.03 (0.16)
0.04 (0.2) 0.03 (0.16)
Females
Males
(CE)
(CE)
2.23 (1.3) 2.24 (1.21)
1.56 (1.27) 1.76 (1.9)
6.00 (0.74) 6.08 (0.67)
3.08 (2.25) 2.61 (2.41)
1.23 (1.43) 1.05 (1.74)

Notes: Presented as difference in mean with standard deviation in parentheses

We see a similar pattern when looking at educational attainment per student. Table 3
examines activities such as coursework and time spent studying. Again, group means are
fairly similar by age but differ between the middle and upper schools. Perhaps the two
most illuminating measures of educational attainment we have are the coursework variables:
number of AP classes taken and highest math class taken since these measures are housed
entirely within the schools. With few exceptions, middle schoolers do not sit for AP classes,
and within the upper schools, students take roughly the same number of AP classes (KruskalWallis test, p = 0.13). Furthermore, when we restrict the scope of educational attainment to
just mathematics, the students remain similar. Every subject in the sample has progressed
beyond 6th grade math. In middle school, the highest math class a subject has taken is
usually Pre-Algebra or Algebra 1, (KW, p = 0.30), and Pre-Calc for high schoolers (KW,
6

To clarify, by team sports we mean baseball, basketball, cricket, football, hockey, kickball, lacrosse,
soccer, softball, ultimate frisbee and volleyball.
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p = 0.36).
Unfortunately, we cannot randomly assign subjects into a single sex school. As such, a
concern with selection into the schools is that there is an unobserved component of the education production function that affects both the risk taking and competitive behavior of girls
as well as their school choice. However, the prior closeness between the two schools as well
as these demographic similarities and our survey data on athletics and family environment
suggest that any family considering enrollment in one likely considers the other as well. One
potential difference is that the co-ed school serves more grades. If increased exposure to
single sex schooling increases its impact on risk taking and competitive behaviors, we would
expect to see larger difference in the older girls. Regardless, we are comfortable positing that
our estimates reflect the treatment effect of the all girls school, conditional on selecting into
it.
Our interest in demographics also reflects our prior belief that a subject’s willingness
to compete is not only affected by personal preferences, but also the composition of the
experimental group. This belief echoes the concerns made by Gneezy and Rustichini (2004),
among others. However, here group composition goes beyond number of athletes in one’s
group, and also reflects the gender composition of the group in the co-ed school, since
experimental sessions were conducted within (but not across) schools and subjects were
not separated into all-male or all-female groups at the co-ed school. We look more closely
at gender composition below; however we present an overview of the group composition in
Figure II.2, which shows the distribution of CE groups by their percent women. Obviously, SS
groups are entirely women, so adding them to the figure would merely skew the distribution.
CE groups are 52% female on average. It is noteworthy that while we do not have any entirely
female groups within the CE sessions, we do have groups that are mostly women (75% or
greater). Furthermore, 31% of groups are more than 50% female with another 27% being
50% exactly. This variation in gender mix allows us to control for the SS-CE comparison
econometrically.
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Figure II.2: Gender composition of CE groups

Figures II.3 and II.4 examine the athletic composition of the participant groups by percent
of players on team sports and players on sports that require substantial hand-eye coordination, respectively. Across figures II.3 and II.4 these distributions are similar since many team
sports involve significant hand-eye coordination (and vice-versa). Within each figure, we see
the distributions starting out very tightly packed in middle school and becoming diffuse as
we move to older students, confirming the earlier conclusion that sport participation declines
as we transition from middle to upper school. Specifically, the SS upper schoolers have the
widest distributions of both team and hand-eye sports. As discussed earlier it is important
to note that here, the CE sessions were, by construction, co-educational. Thus, figures 3
and 4 only consider the 2x2 design of experimental sessions (CE and SS; middle school and
upper school), as opposed to looking at all 6 test groups separately.
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Figure II.3: Hand-Eye sports participation by experimental group

Recall, the purpose of these experiments is to revisit competing theories of nature versus nurture. In particular, we examine the nurturing effects that selecting into an all-girl
schooling environment has on the risk taking and competitive behavior of women. Given
this goal and the resulting data, it is now appropriate to discuss relevant hypotheses. First
we consider the 4 central hypotheses, which are informed by conventional wisdom and the
recent literature:

50

Figure II.4: Team sports participation by experimental group

Hypothesis 1 Girls educated in a single sex school are less risk averse than girls educated
in a co-education school.
Hypothesis 2 The risk profile of girls at a single sex school is similar to that of boys at a
co-educational school.
Hypothesis 3 Girls in a single sex school are more likely to elect to compete than girls in
a co-education school.
Hypothesis 4 The competition profile of girls at a single sex school is similar to that of
boys at a co-educational school.
We exploit the closeness of our sample and the richness of our dataset in our examination of
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these hypotheses. To this end, we also consider several tangential hypotheses, which follow
from H1-H4, and are unique to our experiment:
Hypothesis 5 5.a: Competitive sports positively influence competitive behavior.
5.b: Competitive sports positively influence risk taking behavior.
This influence may come about from multiple channels. For example, people who participate in sports may be more willing to compete in the experiment, non-athletes may be less
willing to compete when in an athletic group, or some combination thereof.
These experiments also investigate the influence adolescent development has on this behavior. Accordingly, we specify a hypothesis addressing differences across age groups.
Hypothesis 6 The behavior of SS young girls is approximately equal to the behavior of CE
young girls.
Given our supposition that “nurture exceeds nature”, we expect younger girls to be
similar across schools. However, we want to know if the differences between girls are causing
selection into individually optimal educational environments, or are different schools shaping
different behaviors in female students? In addressing this question, we implicitly view boys as
a reference group, and assume that the difference between girls and boys is inversely related
to the year in school (which proxies the length of exposure to educational environment). We
now specify two final hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7 Due to exposure, differences in competition rates between SS and CE girls
are greater in the older cohorts.
Hypothesis 8 Competition rates increase with the number of girls in a group.
Differential rates in competition imply that the presence of boys stabilizes or normalizes
female behavior. Thus there may be group effects with regards to the gender makeup of
the group. Coming full circle, these suggestions are closely related to hypothesis 1—the risk
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posture of girls across schooling. However, hypothesis 8 does not identify the channel for
choice to compete. That is, we remain agnostic whether we have observed SS girls being
more competitive or a preference for competing (not competing) against girls (boys).

II.5

Results
Table II.4: CRRA Risk Attitudes
Panel A: Summary Statistics
SS
SS
CE
Middle
Upper F-Middle
0.46
0.50
0.40
(0.05)
(0.01)
(0.05)

CE
F-Upper
0.38
(0.08)

CE
M-Middle
0.36
(0.04)

CE
M-Upper
0.38
(0.05)

CE
M-Middle
0.00
(30261)
0.00
(12858)
0.00
(5488)
0.01
(18093)

CE
M-Upper
0.00
(24416)
0.00
(10165)
0.16
(4243)
0.56
(14431)
0.07
(8458)

Notes: Presented as as means with standard deviation parentheses

Panel B: Rank-Sum Test Results
SS
CE
Upper F-Middle
SS
0.00
0.00
Middle
(35396) (16510)
SS
0.00
Upper
(6628)
CE
F-Middle
CE
F-Upper
CE
M-Middle

CE
F-Upper
0.00
(48132)
0.00
(21388)
0.53
(9563)

Notes: Presented as p-value with adjusted variance in parentheses

Hypotheses 1 and 2 concerned risk attitudes, so first we consider the risk profiles of our
subjects. Using the data elicited from our risk task, we specify a CRRA utility function
and conduct a structural estimation of risk attitudes. Table II.4, panel A, lists summary
statistics on risk preference. The reader will note that preferences range from risk neutral
(ρ = 0.028) to solidly risk averse (ρ = 0.53), where SS subjects are the most risk averse,
regardless of age group. There is no statistical difference in risk aversion between age groups
(p = 0.376). However, boys are considerably less risk averse than girls (p = 0.00), consistent
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with findings in the previous literature. Both in general and throughout the sample, SS girls
tend to be the most risk-averse, with CE girls being less so, and CE male subjects are the
least risk averse.
Figure II.5: Box plot of risk Preferences across test groups

Figure II.5 shows information on risk preference using box plots. It not only illustrates
that the central tendency of the SS girls is to be more risk averse, as stated above, but also
how uniform SS girls are in their risk preference. Boys in our sample were the least risk
averse. Hypothesis testing confirms this result—that SS girls are in fact more risk averse
than both CE boys and girls. This result is remarkably robust regardless of specification. It
holds in the middle and upper schools as well as both parametrically and non-parametrically.
As a formal test of hypothesis 1 we conduct Mann-Whitney (MW) tests (Table II.4, panel
B) against the null hypothesis that risk attitudes between groups have the same central
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tendency. For both middle and upper school girls, we strongly reject this null in favor
of the alternative that SS are more risk averse (p = 0.00, p = 0.00). Furthermore, the
results hold when we ignore grade level and just compare school type (SS vs. CE, p = 0.00).
Formal testing of hypothesis 2 requires the same methodology, with the specification modified
to compare SS girls to (CE) boys. Table II.5, panel B, shows that in both the middle
school and the upper school, there is a significant difference between SS girls and (CE) boys
(p = 0.00, 0.00); thus, we strongly reject the nulls from both hypotheses 1 and 2.
Result 1 Girls from the single sex school are not significantly less risk averse than coed girls
Result 2 Girls from the single sex school are significantly more risk averse than coed boys
However, despite this apparent risk aversion, it is remarkable that SS girls opt to compete
more than their CE counterparts. This result is discussed in more depth below, following a
discussion of the gender neutrality of the competition task.
Table II.5: Lobs made by test group
Group:
Mean
SS-Middle
2.363636
SS-Upper
2.955556
CE, F-Middle
2.8
CE, F-Upper
2.571429
CE, M-Middle
3.625
CE, M-Upper 3.323529
Total
2.841155

SD
Min
1.485979
0
1.91828
0
1.632993
0
1.38639
0
2.034163
0
2.211822
0
1.782576
0

Max
7
7
6
6
8
9
9

We examine this appropriateness three ways: loosely termed performance, earnings, and
rationality. Performance is simply how well a subject did in the task. That is, how many
balls were successfully lobbed in the bucket, described in detail in table II.5. We see that
at least one person in each test group missed every ball, and no subject successfully lobbed
all ten. However, there is some difference between boys and girls. This difference is perhaps
better illustrated in figure II.6, the histograms of performance by gender, given grade level,
which shows this difference is mostly coming through the tails. More girls are successfully
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Figure II.6: Histogram of performance by gender, by age

lobbing fewer than three and no girl lobbed more than seven. While there is some significance
to this performance gap (Pearsons χ2 , p = 0.01), there is also a great deal of overlap between
the distributions. This overlap holds for both age groups, and the difference is only coming
through the right tail. As such, we are comfortable drawing statistical inferences from this
task.
Furthermore, subjects tend to earn the same amount across genders and age groups.
Figure II.7 depicts box plots of earnings; note that each of our test groups had similar
median earnings. Most of the sample earned less than $20, and girls are well represented
among the highest earners. In fact, of the 15 possible MW pairwise tests in table II.6, the
only test groups who experienced significantly different earnings were the SS middle schoolers
compared to the SS high schoolers (p = 0.03).
Finally, we ask the question: how much would subjects have earned had they switched
their competitive choice (If one who chose to compete opted for piece-rate payment and
vice versa). For exposition, we term this maximizing argument “rationality”. We measure
rationality in absolute (differenced-earnings) terms. That is if a subject would have earned
more in the other payment scheme (differenced-earnings are less than zero), he or she made
an “irrational” choice. In these terms, Mann-Whitney tests in table II.7 show no group was
pairwise more rational than another. Specifically, the smallest p-values were 0.08 and 0.09,
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Figure II.7: Earnings by Test Group

for SS middle schoolers when compared to their two female upper school counterparts. All
other p-values were greater than 0.317 .
Given these similar earnings patterns across the sample, we formally examine the decision
to compete in hypotheses 3 and 4. Table II.8 outlines descriptive statistics and the results
of our tests of these hypotheses, conducted using Pearson’s χ2 tests. Middle school boys
appear to be the most competitive, opting to compete 60% of the time. Remarkably, even
though SS girls are more risk averse than CE girls, they also choose to compete more often.
Addressing hypothesis 3, SS middle schoolers compete significantly more than both CE
middle school girls (p = 0.00) and upper school girls (p = 0.01). SS upper schoolers compete
more than CE middle girls (p = 0.04) but their choices are not significantly different than the
7

These results are robust to when we consider only the binary state (that is rational or irrational), where
no p-value is less than 0.10.
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Table II.6: Experimental Earnings
Panel A: Summary Statistics
SS
SS
CE
Middle
Upper F-Middle
5.17
8.13
5.04
(8.14)
(9.74)
(3.66)

CE
F-Upper
5.89
(5.25)

CE
M-Middle
9.25
(10.88)

CE
M-Upper
7.35
(9.58)

Notes: Presented as as means with standard deviation parentheses

Panel B: Rank-Sum Test Results
SS
CE
CE
CE
Upper F-Middle F-Upper M-Middle
SS
-2.10
-1.20
-1.65
-1.86
Middle
(0.036)
(0.23)
(0.00)
(0.06)
SS
0.731
0.561
-0.192
Upper
(0.464)
(0.575)
(0.85)
CE
-0.166
-0.683
F-Middle
(0.868)
(0.494)
CE
-0.66
F-Upper
(0.51)
CE
M-Middle

CE
M-Upper
-1.04
(0.30)
0.68
(0.494)
0.078
(0.938)
0.233
(0.816)
0.646
(0.518)

Notes: Presented as z-score with p-value in parentheses

CE upper school girls (p = 0.53). There is no statistical difference in the choice to compete
between SS middle schoolers and either middle school or upper school boys (Pearson’s χ2 , p =
0.67, 0.57; respectively). In the SS upper school we see a similar result. Though middle
school boys compete marginally more, this result is not statistically significant. Thus, our
findings regarding competition are predominately consistent with hypotheses 3&4—that SS
girls compete similar to boys and more than CE girls.
Result 3 Middle-school girls in a single sex school are significantly more likely to compete
than girls in a co-educational school.
Result 4 The competition profile of girls at a single sex school is not significantly different
from that of boys at a co-educational school.
While non-parametric tests provide a good overview of the competition choice problem,
a structural model allows us to recover deep preference parameters and jointly estimate
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Table II.7: Subject Rationality
Panel A: Summary Statistics
SS
SS
CE
Middle
Upper F-Middle
5.17
8.13
5.04
(8.14)
(9.74)
(3.66)

CE
F-Upper
5.89
(5.25)

CE
M-Middle
9.25
(10.88)

CE
M-Upper
7.35
(9.58)

Notes: Presented as as means with standard deviation parentheses

Panel B: Rank-Sum Test Results
SS
CE
CE
Upper F-Middle F-Upper
SS
0.0855
0.3658
0.0837
Middle
(35168) (16309)
(47649)
SS
0.4378
0.7444
Upper
(6591)
(21224)
CE
0.6071
F-Middle
(9453)
CE
F-Upper
CE
M-Middle

CE
M-Middle
0.0687
(30033)
0.7193
(12817)
0.3091
(5436)
0.4418
(17933)

CE
M-Upper
0.6571
(24159)
0.3980
(10112)
0.8350
(4200)
0.4748
(14311)
0.3170
(8451)

Notes: Presented as z-score with p-value in parentheses

those parameters while providing a more complete interpretation of the decision to compete.
Of course, there are additional methods for examining this decision to compete, which we
consider for robustness and sensitivity. Assuming the choice to compete is a latent process,
a great benefit of our design is our use of multiple tasks to identify these latent parameters.
Furthermore, there is reason to believe risk attitudes affect the decision to compete. For
instance, Datta Gupta et al. (2013) find that a woman’s degree of risk aversion influences
her decision to select each compensation scheme. Using our experimental data, we estimate
a joint structural model of risk attitude and the decision to compete. However, we show that
these attitudes do not significantly impact the decision to compete.
Marginal effects from the relevant estimation are shown in table II.9, with upper school
boys serving as the reference group8 . These effects show significant differences in risk attitude
between upper school boys and both male and SS middle schoolers. Consistent with our
8

Consistent with the existing literature, we conduct our estimation using frequency weighting.
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Table II.8: Decision to Compete
Panel A: Summary Statistics
SS
SS
CE
Middle
Upper F-Middle
0.558
0.4
0.16
(0.499)
(0.495)
(0.374)

CE
CE
F-Upper M-Middle
0.339
0.6
(0.477)
(0.496)

CE
M-Upper
0.5
(0.507)

Notes: Presented as as means with standard deviation parentheses
2

Panel B: Pearson’s χ
SS
Upper
SS
0.091
Middle
(2.8519)
SS
Upper
CE
F-Middle
CE
F-Upper
CE
M-Middle

Test Results
CE
CE
F-Middle F-Upper
0.001
0.012
(12.0587) (6.2573)
0.038
0.529
(4.2955) (0.3962)
0.098
(2.7324)

CE
M-Middle
0.666
(0.1858)
0.066
(3.3887)
0.001
(12.1467)
0.011
(6.4136)

CE
M-Upper
0.569
(0.3244)
0.376
(0.7849)
0.007
(7.2648)
0.131
(2.2768)
0.388
(0.7438)

Notes: Presented as p-value with χ2 score in parentheses

earlier results, boys are less risk averse and girls are more risk averse. Specifically, as we
shift focus to middle school boys the average coefficient of relative risk aversion decrease by
0.06.
Turning to SS middle schoolers, CRRA coefficients increase by 0.127. However, the lack
of significance in the competition column suggests these differences in risk attitude are not
driving decisions to compete. This result is consistent with Wozniak et al. (2014) as well as
Kuhn and Villeval (2015) who find controlling for risk attitude has little impact on female
willingness to compete and cooperate, respectively.
Another measure of competitiveness, “residual competitiveness,” has recently been used
in the economics literature (Buser et al. 2014, further explored by Reuben et al. 2015).
This measure is obtained by saving the residual from a (robust) linear probability model
regression of the decision to compete on performance and CRRA risk attitude, two variables
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Table II.9: Joint Estimation (Marginal Effects)

SS Middle
SS Upper
CE, F-Middle
CE, M-Middle
CE, F-Upper
ρ
Constant
N

ρ
Compete
0.127*
(0.0138)
0.0105
(0.0149)
0.0174
(0.0171)
-0.0619*
(0.0152)
-0.00156
(0.0142)
-0.133
(0.493)
0.395*
-0.139
(0.0113) (0.212)
30,470
30,470

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.01

considered to be implicit in the choice to compete9 . Thus, higher (i.e. more positive)
residuals are indicative of more competitive behavior. We report these means and compare
them formally in table II.10. Clearly, SS middle schoolers are highly competitive with CE
girls (all ages) being the least competitive. Specifically, students in the SS middle school
are more competitive than upper school boys (p = 0.01) and upper school SS girls are as
competitive as (that is not significantly less competitive than) middle school boys (p = 0.47)
or upper school boys (p = 0.32).
Earlier, we considered extracurricular activities such as participation in sports. Given the
nature of these activities, it is reasonable to think that they influence competitive behavior.
This influence can come across as athletes competing differentially and/or subjects having
preferences over competing against athletes. For these reasons, we specified hypotheses
5.a and 5.b—that competitive sports positively influence both risk taking and competitive
behaviors. To test these, we first ran a probit regression of team sports participation and the
9

Probit regressions have roughly the same deviance residual, but are considerably less intuitive to interpret.
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Table II.10: Residual Competitiveness
Panel A: Summary Statistics
SS
SS
CE
Middle
Upper F-Middle
0.117
-0.047
-0.292
(0.5)
(0.493)
(0.38)

CE
F-Upper
-0.112
(0.478)

CE
M-Middle
0.132
(0.491)

CE
M-Upper
0.039
(0.508)

Notes: Presented as as means with standard deviation parentheses

Panel B:Rank Sum Test Results
SS
CE
Upper F-Middle
SS
1.77
3.4
Middle
(0.077) (0.0001)
SS
2.32
Upper
(0.02)
CE
F-Middle
CE
F-Upper
CE
M-Middle

CE
CE
F-Upper M-Middle
3.68
2.24
(0.0002)
(0.025)
1.47
0.079
(0.142)
(0.937)
-1.6
-2.43
(0.11)
(0.015)
-1.08
(0.28)

CE
M-Upper
2.39
(0.017)
0.446
(0.656)
-1.85
(0.063)
-0.85
(0.396)
0.179
(0.858)

Notes: Presented as z-score with p-value in parentheses

proportion of subjects in the group who compete in a team sport on the subject’s decision
to compete. Table II.11, column (1) illustrates the marginal effects. We see that those who
participate in a team sport compete significantly more. Specifically, if a subject plays a team
sport, he or she is almost 17% more likely to compete. Looking over to column (2), which
includes controls for test group (with upper school boys as a reference group) we see that
those who participate in a team sport still compete about 17% more than others, and having
more athletes in your group has a significant negative impact on the choice to compete. The
implication here is athletes are more apt to compete, and subjects dislike competing against
athletes10 . However it does not appear that participation in sports influences risk attitudes.
Thus we find support for Hypothesis 5.a, but not for 5.b.
Result 5 Competitive sports favorably influences competitive behavior, but has no effect on
10

This interpretation is conditional on subjects knowing the sports their group members participate in, a
safe assumption given our subject pool.
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risk attitude.
Table II.11: Probit of Sports on Decision to Compete (Marginal Effects)
(1)
0.167**
(0.0660)
Percent of Group in a Team Sport -0.0637
(0.157)
SS-Middle

Plays in a Team Sport

SS-Upper
CE, F-Middle
CE, F-Upper
CE, M-Middle

(2)
0.176***
(0.0674)
-0.584**
(0.286)
0.214
(0.143)
-0.0514
(0.117)
-0.228
(0.144)
-0.181*
(0.101)
0.245*
(0.146)

Note: N=277, Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1

Earlier we noted that middle schoolers tend to be less risk-averse than the upper schoolers
in general. This observation suggests that exposure to the school environment may influence
risk attitude. As such, we examine the effect that school choice has on the behavior of young
girls in hypothesis 6, positing that girls are similar across school types. However, we have
shown that in middle school, SS girls are significantly more risk averse (Table II.4, p = 0.00),
yet compete significantly more than their CE counterparts (Table II.8, p = 0.00), thus we
reject hypothesis 6.
Result 6 In young girls, both risk taking and competitive behavior is significantly different
across school types.
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Table II.12: “Difference-in-Differences” Estimations

Upper School
Single Gender
Upper*SS
Constant
R-squared

(CRRA)
-0.0242*
(0.0138)
0.0616***
(0.0132)
0.0625***
(0.0175)
0.403***
(0.0115)
0.416

(Competed?)
0.179
(0.115)
0.398***
(0.110)
-0.338**
(0.146)
0.160*
(0.0958)
0.072

Note: N=203, Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1

The difference between both risk attitudes and competition decisions suggests we can
consider the treatment effect of exposure to single sex schooling on girls. Hypothesis 7 asks
whether these differences increase with said exposure. As a formal test of it, we restrict our
attention to female subjects and calculate a “pseudo difference-in-differences” estimation:
y = β1 + δ1 (Upper School + β2 (SS) + δ2 (Upper*SS) + µ
where y can be specified as the decision to compete or the CRRA coefficient and δ2 is the
treatment effect of exposure to single sex education, conditional on selecting in. Table II.12
presents the results from this estimation. In both specifications, the coefficient on exposure,
δ2 , is significant, yet the sign of the effect switches depending on whether we are measuring
its effect on risk attitude or the decision to compete. Specifically, we measure that the
coefficient of relative risk aversion increases by 0.06, while the decision to compete decreases
by 34%.
However, taking seriously the simulations of Bertrand et al. (2004), we note this “treatment” is at the school level, and clustering is therefore infeasible. We instead refer to the
above evidence as supporting the following observation:
Observation 1 Conditional on selecting into it, the treatment effect of increased exposure
to single sex schooling is that girls become more risk averse, and compete less.
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At first glance, this observation may seem bizarre, but it is actually quite profound, and
underscores the fact that the various differences between girls are coming through at the
middle school grade levels11 .
Table II.13: Female Competition in Groups of Majority (> 50%) Girls
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Decision to Compete
0.428
(0.502)

Residual Competitiveness
-0.021
(0.505)

Note: All groups were CE, Upper, Presented as as means with standard deviation parentheses

Panel B: Rank Sum Test Results
Decision to Compete
vs. SG, Middle
1.269
(0.204)
vs. SG, Upper
-0.256
(0.798)

Residual Competitiveness
2.225
(0.026)
0.432
(0.666)

Notes: Presented as z-score with p-value in parentheses

Bearing the above in mind, there is a shortcoming that needs to be addressed. In sessions
conducted at the co-ed school, we did not have any all-female groups. However, there is
significant variability in the CE group composition (see Figure II.2). This variability led us
to specify hypothesis 8, which relates competitive behavior to the gender composition of the
subject group. This suggests that the SS preference to compete may actually be a preference
to compete against girls (or reluctance to compete against boys)12 . In our sample, 35 CE
(upper school) girls had groups of at least 50% girls. We leverage this variability in group size
and composition, and conduct Mann-Whitney U tests on this sub-sample to test hypothesis
8. An argument in favor of a female preference to compete against girls arises when we
restrict the analysis to this sub-sample and present these findings in Table II.13. It shows
that CE girls in these heavily female groups now opt to compete 43% of the time—over 50%
more than CE girls on average. Furthermore, they are no longer significantly different from
11

One seminar participant went so far as to suggest that SG schools may have a homogenizing effect on
young women.
12
There are other possibilities, for instance opting to (not) compete could suggest a preference (aversion)
to feedback.
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SS girls in either middle school (p = 0.204) or upper school (p = 0.798). Thus we fail to
reject the null of hypothesis 8, which may suggest that group gender composition is driving
observation 1. That is, with more girls in a CE group, the more similar it looks to an SS
group, or in other words:
Observation 2 Tournament entry rates significantly increase with the number of girls in a
group.

II.6

Concluding Remarks

In a November 2014 article of the New York Times, a third grade math teacher commented
that she turns math lessons into games because her male students enjoy competition (Rich,
2014). Research has demonstrated that this sort of preference has implications for both
educational and later-life outcomes. Recently, policy makers have proposed increases in
single sex schooling as a way to increase equity in education and decrease the gender gap that
may result from differences in these preferences. However, these proposals lack a theoretical
understanding of why these differences exist and may lead to unintended consequences.
In this paper, we run an experiment to disentangle competing theories in the context of
single sex education. While much of the evidence on the subject suffers from the question
of who is selecting into these schools, we attempt to mitigate these sample selection issues.
We conduct our experiment in two closely matched schools and focus our results on the
structural differences that exist conditional on selecting into a single gendered environment.
Our experimental results suggest that indeed, girls educated in coed environments do
shy away from competition. However, girls schooled in single sex environments compete just
as much as their male, coed counterparts. Additionally, they elect to compete despite an
apparent risk aversion across financial gains.
These results speak to the nature-versus-nurture debate and lend credence to the conclusion that nurture matters when it comes to making competitive choices. Furthermore, single
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sex schooling appears to be nurturing in such a way that the competition is rational—that
is, it is not being guided by a preference for risk, but rather an appropriate calculation of
that risk.
These findings are relevant to recent policy proposals and controversies regarding gender
segregated education. They demonstrate several effects that single sex schooling can have
on economically relevant decisions. Our paper has expanded this line of research in both
experimental design and estimation techniques. However, we conclude by stressing the need
for further research in this area.
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Chapter III
The Richness of Giving:
Charity Selection and Charitable Gifts in a Large Field Experiment

III.1

Introduction

In 1772, Alexander Hamilton famously arrived in New York City from St. Croix as the
result of charitable donations from the local populace. Over 200 years later, benevolent
giving to charity now hovers at slightly above 2% of US GDP, and approximately 76% of
Americans contribute to at least one charitable organization each month (World Giving
Index, 2013). However, we still know very little about the decision to donate to charity, the
motivations behind it, and in particular, the mechanism behind one’s charitable choice.
In this paper we examine this mechanism by means of an economic experiment. Charitable giving in many lab and field experiments (artefactual or otherwise), has previously been
modeled as a 2-dimensional dictator game. That is, a game played between oneself and a
charity. However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has yet examined the mechanism
behind one’s choice of said charity or operationalized it in these experimental environments.
In these giving experiments the charities to which a subject can donate tend to be either
anonymous, presented without a choice, or only selected through what we call the restricted
choice method (such as from an ad-hoc list of ten charities). Accordingly, in this paper we
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run an experiment where the unsure components are not only how much the subjects chose
to give, but also to which charities they chose to give. In this way, our experiment examines
this choice mechanism, and uses it to disentangle motives behind giving.
These charitable and philanthropic motives were first discussed by Becker (1974). In
this essay he outlines the following three rationales: improvement of the general well being,
receiving social acclaim, and avoidance of scorn. In the years hence, we have come to think
of these motives as efficiency concerns, warm glow, and social pressures, respectively.
Whereas the formalization of social pressures remains relatively novel (DellaVigna et al.
2012; Lazear et al. 2012), the concepts of efficiency and warm glow, sometimes thought
of a pure and impure altruism, have long been discussed. In an effort to improve model
predictions and comment on the nature of individual donations, Andreoni (1989) introduces
impure altruism, and then (1990) formalizes a theory of warm-glow giving, where a person
exhibiting warm glow can have both altruistic and egoistic motives for giving. Later papers
have suggested alternate reasons for this warm-glow, such as signaling benefits of giving to
others (Bénabou and Tirole 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008).
Taken in the context of our model, we can think of pure altruism (as opposed to warmglow) as dependent on the relative price of giving. One notable implication of here, is that
pure altruism is only concerned with the amount of public good ultimately provided. As such,
giving can be fully crowded out by what other individuals, firms, or governments provide.
In a broad overview of the subject, Vesterlund (2006) further discusses these motives for
giving, citing observational and experimental evidence in the context of a classical demand
setting.
Distinguishing between these motives is important to both further our economic understanding of giving and, subsequently, inform optimal policies. Given these pro forma
descriptions, economic experiments have previously tried to disentangle motives for giving
by focusing on design and design choice. In particular, experiments have tended to use either
linear public goods games (e.g. Andreoni 1993; Goeree et al. 2002) or dictator games, similar
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to the modified one we use in this paper1 .
In the first paper to introduce real charities as a dictator recipient, Eckel and Grossman
(1996) vary receipts between anonymous subjects and the American Red Cross. They find
that subjects are more willing to donate to charity and conclude (some form of) altruism is a
motivating factor. To disentangle altruistic motives, Crumpler and Grossman (2008) extend
this design, with the stipulation that the experimenter will fully crowd out any amount
donated to charity. As such, any subject still opting to donate is taken as an incidence of
warm glow.
As a response to Crumpler and Grossman, Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2014) use multiple
to decisions to identify warm glow, noting that otherwise the observed effect could in fact
be purely altruistic feelings towards the experimenter. In doing so, they are able to place
bounds on the magnitudes of various motives for giving. However, these quantities are not
parameter estimates, and the authors note that their results may not generalize to other
settings.
As such, we design our experiment to create a richness of data and subject pool. This
allows us to impose a standard utility (CES) framework and estimate a structural model to
fully quantify (rather than rule out) motives for giving.
Though this emphasis on structure is relatively novel in the literature its importance has
been clearly stated. Recent papers (e.g. Huck et al. 2015) have used this methodology to
focus on the fundraising side of philanthropy. However, DellaVigna et al. (2012) stress the
importance of these approaches to estimate individual motives for giving. We extend this
line of research to examine these motives inframarginally.
Further, Vesterlund (2006) cautions against interpreting aggregate elasticities when not
all contributors experience the same changes in marginal tax rate. Rather, to better inform
tax policy, individual elasticity estimates should be used. Chay et al. (2005) voice a similar
concern that individual elasticities are necessary for unbiased welfare estimates in the market
1

For this reason I will focus on dictator games in this brief review.
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for clean air.
Taking these concerns into account, we set up our experiment such that the data act as
a lens to examine charitable choices, i.e., the choices one undertakes when deciding where
to give, whether to give, and how much to give to charity. Previous dictator designs have
tended to not vary the price of giving or subject income in the experiment. The novelty of our
design, as well as the richness of our data and that fact that we observe it at the individuallevel, allows us to impose a structure (discussed further below) that we use to recover the
deep parameters of these preferences for giving. In this note we examine rationality of
these choices and decompose our parameter estimates across demographics and the types of
selected charities.
We also take seriously the advice of DellaVigna et al. (2013) who note the inherent
difficulties of predicting which causes individuals will give to. We ask experimental subjects
to choose their most preferred charity from a much richer set of organizations. In doing so
we are also able to gather data that inform us of charity preference. Though non-causal, we
correlate these data with subject demographics and estimated parameters. We ask if there
are interesting co-movements between distributional preferences and various these chosen
charities. If so, do these preference parameters for charitable giving differ from what we
have observed in the past with person-to-person gifts? Finally, we ask if we can exploit this
information and the in-subject heterogeneity to increase charitable giving in the naturallyoccurring world.
As such, our paper speaks to the literature in both public and behavioral economics. Our
contribution to these literatures is our development and estimation of the structural model
in the context of a richer set of both givers and recipient organizations. In so doing, we
estimate and comment on full parameter distributions, rather than simple sample averages.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents our contextual framework, experimental design, and data. Section 3 discusses the consistency of choices and our structural
estimates. Section 4 looks at the mechanism of charitable choice and selected charity. A
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final section concludes.

III.2

Experimental Design

III.2.1

The ALP

For the purposes of structurally measuring distributional preferences in our experiment,
we required a large and diverse sample of subjects that differs from the standard undergraduate population. In this sense, we classify our work as an artefactual field experiment to use
the terminology of Harrison and List (2004). Accordingly, we chose to embed our software
in the RAND Corporation’s American Life Panel (ALP henceforth) and conduct and incentivized experiment. The ALP is a 6,000 member, U.S.-based, Internet panel. Its unique
interface allows researchers to conduct sophisticated experiments matched with individually
rich demographic data. Panelists are recruited through a number of different ways, including randomized recruitment, providing us with a representative sample, as well as HRS-style
demographic data2 .
The composition of our subject pool is described in table III.1, which has demographic
information on those who completed the experiment, those who started but did not finish,
as well as comparative US population data from the American Community Survey3 .
Subjects in our experiment hail from every state except Alaska. They range in age from
22 to 92. Our sample is 55% female and slightly less than 80% white. 45% of our subjects
hold a college degree and the employment figures are roughly similar to the US population
as a whole.
2

For more information on the ALP, please visit: https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/.
For the purposes of GARP and CES analysis, we consider a “complete” experiment as completing 45 or
more dictator allocations.
3
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Table III.1: Subject Demographic Averages
Variable
Female
Age (Median)
18-44
65+
Caucasian
African American
Native American
Asian or Pacific Islander
Hispanic or Latino
HS Diploma
College
Employed
Unemployed
Not in the Labor Force

Completed
0.55
57
0.229
0.269
0.799
0.1
0.012
0.022
0.169
0.955
0.448
0.553
0.059
0.389

Started
0.566
57
0.217
0.29
0.783
0.11
0.016
0.022
0.165
0.955
0.446
0.54
0.051
0.409

US Adults
0.58
37.4
0.599
0.137
0.763
0.137
0.017
0.063
0.169
0.862
0.267
0.577
0.058
0.361

Note: US Population Data come from the American Community Survey
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml

III.2.2

Charity Navigator

While there is vast anecdotal evidence that charitable givers prefer to give locally, empirical evidence on the subject remains mixed. Furthermore, local (as well as national) causes
can be highly idiosyncratic in nature. As such, we required a large and diverse set of charities
in addition to the diversity of our subject pool.
To develop this set we turned to the website Charity Navigator, an agency used to rate
charitable organizations4 . Founded in 2001, Charity Navigator rates over 7000 charities and
is the largest and most used rating agency in the United States. Using information from
IRS form 990 returns, Charity Navigator assigns each charity a star rating on the bases of
efficiency (financial health), and accountability (transparency)5 . Empirical evidence suggests
a positive impact of these star ratings on charitable behavior (Gordon et al. 2009; Brown
et al. 2014).
The Charity Navigator website is organized as follows. Each rated charity is placed into
4

http://www.charitynavigator.com.
For a more detailed yet concise description of this star rating methodology, please refer to Table I in
Gordon et al. (2009).
5
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one of nine categories, and each category has as associated list of (between 2 and 6) unique
causes. For instance, “Patient and Family Support” is a cause in the “Health” category. At
the time of this writing, the top rated charity in that cause is Camp John Marc.
For the purposes of this experiment, we scraped the Charity Navigator website for the
top 10 ranked charities within each cause, providing us with a list of 340 charities in total.
The complete list (with associated categories and causes) can be found in appendix G.

III.2.3

Experimental Procedures

As such, subjects in this experiment were first obliged to select their preferred charity
from this list (that is, the charity to which they wish to donate). Immediately after, each
subject makes a series of allocation decisions reflective of a charitable contribution. These
decisions each consist of a modified dictator game played between the subject and his or
her chosen charity. In the standard dictator game, an active player (the dictator) is given
an endowment of wealth, w, and divides it between herself and a passive player such that
total payoffs are given by πd + πo = w. This stipulation necessarily restricts the slope of the
budget line to −1.
We differ from this standard dictator framework in two crucial ways. Firstly, the passive
player is a charity of the dictator’s own choosing. Secondly, we follow the generalization of
the dictator game developed by Andreoni and Miller (2002). Budget sets are still linear in
this game form, but the price of giving (donating) varies such that total payoffs are now
represented as xi + pg g = w where xi is the payoff to oneself and pg is the relative price of
donating to charity. The purpose of this variation is twofold. First, we answer the seminal
question: can this giving be consistent with individually rational behavior? That is, are
patterns of giving are consistent with the axioms of revealed preference? Secondly, the price
and income variation over several decisions allows use to trace out each subject’s preferences
for giving.
When subjects first log onto the experimental interface, they are given a instructions
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Figure III.1: Average Fraction Donated

and a broad overview of the experiment. We explain to them that they will be selecting a
charity of their choice and then given opportunities to allocate between themselves and that
charity. To select a charity, subjects are taken through a set of expandable and collapsible
tables adapted from the Charity Navigator website. The tables consist of populated lists. A
subject is first instructed to pick a category. Each choice of category feeds into its associated
list of causes. The selection of a given cause expands the list to the top 10 highest rated
charities (as determined by the Charity Navigator website) for that particular cause. From
there the subject is instructed to pick his or her preferred charity. If the subject so desires,
or if no charity is to his or her liking, a charity write-in option is provided.
After selecting a charity, each session consists of 50 independent dictator problems. The
number number of choices allows us to generate the rich data needed for individual level
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statistical inference6 . In each round, the subject is asked to allocate tokens between two
accounts: the personal account of the participant (henceforth self ), and the account of the
chosen charity (henceforth charity). Each decision problem starts by having the computer
select a budget line randomly from the set of lines that intersect at least one axis at or above
the 50 token level and intersect both axes at or below the 100 token levels. The budget lines
selected for each subject in his decision problems are independent of each other and of the
budget lines selected for other subjects in their decision problems.
Next, the subject chooses an allocation along the budget line. To choose an allocation,
subjects use the mouse or the arrows on the keyboard to move the pointer on the computer
screen to the desired allocation. This point-and-click design is adapted from Fisman et al.
(2007). The benefits to using this software are manifold. Among them, the ability to represent consumer choice problems graphically is simple and easy for subjects to understand, and
the choice environment allows for the generalization of individual preferences. Additionally,
the design can be easily adapted to many other kinds of individual choice problems. A subject’s view of the computer program dialog window is shown in the attached experimental
instructions located in appendix H.
The payoff for each decision round is determined by the number of tokens each account
(self and charity). At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selects one decision
round for payment for each participant. The subject is then paid the amount earned in that
round using to the conversion rate 2 tokens = 1 dollar.
The average subject passed 54% of her tokens. Figure III.1 shows this distribution of
percent of tokens donated to charity at the subject level.
6

This number reflects the Bronars calibration in Choi et al. 2007 who show that the distribution of
consistency values is skewed to the left as the number of budget sets increases.
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III.3

Results

Broadly speaking, motives for giving tend to reflect either the efficiency or “warm-glow”
concerns discussed above. We can think of the parameters for these concerns as boiling down
to whether or not the act of giving itself is independent of the price of giving. Accordingly,
in this section we examine the parameters within this analytical framework.

III.3.1

Rationality

However, before we can examine these equity/efficiency tradeoffs, we must first confirm
that the data generated by each experimental subject are governed by the principles of utility
maximization. Given that each subject has preferences over herself, xi and the charity, g,
we want to know whether observed choices can be expressed via a utility function Ui =
ui (xi , g), and subsequently, maximize said function. That is, are the data consistent with
the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference or GARP. The practice of seeing if the data
satisfy GARP follows Varian (1982)7 .
In order to see if, how, and to what extent the data comply with GARP we use Afriat’s
(1972) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) as follows:
Define a generalization of the revealed preference relation RD (et ) such that
xt RD (et )x iff et pt xt ≥ pt x, that is, x would not be affordable at a fraction et
of the income available when the person chose xt . Define R(et ) as the transitive
closure of RD (et ). Then define GARP(et ) as “if xt R(et )xs , then et ps xs ≤ ps xt .”
Then the CCEI is the highest value of et such that there are no violations of
GARP(et ). (Andreoni and Miller 2002)
In short, the CCEI measures the extent to which budget constraints need to be relaxed
in order for violations to no longer violate. By construct, it is bounded between 0 and 1,
7

Note that we restrict our analysis to Walrasian budget sets and therefore implicitly treat preferences as
well-behaved.
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Figure III.2: Distribution of Aftriat’s CCEI

with scores closer to 1 being closer to satisfying GARP. That is, scores closer to 1 are “more
rational”. Among those who completed the experiment, the distribution of CCEI scores are
illustrated as a histogram in figure III.2.
In our data subjects exhibit significant rationality. Over 75% of the data have a CCEI
score greater than 0.8. The mean CCEI score is 0.883, and the modal score in the histogram’s
highest bin8 .
Given this consistent behavior on the part of our panel it is appropriate to think of
charitable giving as a standard utility maximizing activity. Further, we have generated
enough data to estimate these standard parameters at the individual level. As such, we now
test the structural properties of each subject’s individual utility function.
8

i.e., the bin closest to (and inclusive of) 1.
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III.3.2

Structural Model

Similar past experiments (e.g. Fisman et al., 2015) have shown that subjects exhibit
remarkable heterogeneity. Given these demonstrations and our observed pattern of CCEI
scores sufficiently close to 1, we hereby treat the data as generated by a well-behaved utility
function, ud .
Further, to maintain consistency with the previous literature, we assume ud is both
separable and homothetic. These two assumptions taken in concert with the restriction
imposed by our design that choices must be budget balanced imply that ud is of the family
of CES utility functions (equation III.1). In fact, we estimate these CES utility functions
using non-linear tobit MLE (discussed in turn below), and find that this subject heterogeneity
is more pronounced within demographics and charity types, rather than across them.
1

ud = [απdρ + (1 − α)πoρ ] ρ

(III.1)

This utility function only has 2 components. Since people are behaving consistently (maximizing) we choose to keep the model parsimonious and do not include additional parameters.
However, given that some subjects are inconsistent, future research would perhaps benefit
from imposition of additional parameters or more flexible functional forms.
Within the context of a CES framework, these two parameters of interest are ρ and α.
Previously, these parameters have been interpreted in terms of person-to-person giving (see
e.g., Fisman et al., 2007). However, they are also immensely important in terms of charitable
giving, and can easily generalize to other settings as well.
The parameter ρ represents the curvature of each individual’s indifference curves, and
thereby her sensitivity to price9 . Further, α represents the relative weight one puts on self
as opposed charity. As such, we interpret α as the warm-glow parameter.
For any ρ, when α =
9

It follows that

1
ρ−1

1
2

the subject equally weights the payoff to herself and her selected

= σ is the (constant) elasticity of substitution.
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charity. Meanwhile, when ρ > 0, charitable preferences are weighted towards efficiency in
the sense of increasing total payoffs or the “size of the pie”. When ρ < 0, preferences are
weighted towards equity–reducing differences in payoffs or the “slices of the pie”10 . For these
reasons, we extend previous interpretations of ρ and tie it in closely with the concepts of
“pure” altruism in previous giving literatures and “efficiency” in the public goods literature.
Figure III.3: Distribution of Estimated Rho (ρ)

Rho (ρ)
The mean estimated ρ is -2.70 and the median is -0.259. However, the distribution
of estimated rho parameters (depicted in figure III.3) is perhaps more informative. The
distribution is noteworthy in that is highly skewed left with a large spike at ρ ≈ −20. Most
10

i.e. the elasticity of substitution is < −1.
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Figure III.4: Estimated Median Rho (ρ) Values by Subgroup

Dots indicate median values, circles indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for medians

subjects (58%) have a ρ < 0, while 441 (42%) have ρ > 0. In figure III.4 we decompose the
ρ distributions with socio-demographic data collected by the ALP. While the medians differ
by subgroup, overall, the distributions appear similar.
We examine this further with pairwise distributional (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) tests in table
III.2. In these tests, the comparison group is all subjects not in the specified subgroup. For
instance, the comparison group for men is women, for a college degree it is everyone with
less than a college degree. P-values for the ρ distributions are shown in the 3rd column of the
table. While some subgroups (7 out of 22) exhibit statistical difference in their distributions,
this is likely an artifact of multiple hypothesis testing. Further, there are fewer differences
in distribution, then there are differences in means.
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Alpha (α)
Similar to ρ we interpret α in a slightly different fashion than previous work. Whereas
similar person-to-person giving functions have interpreted α as fair-mindedness, in our context (charitable giving and contribution to a public good) we find “warm-glow” to be a more
appropriate interpretation.
The distribution of estimated alpha parameters is depicted in figure III.5.
Figure III.5: Distribution of Estimated Alpha (α)

Again, the full distribution appears to be more informative than the summary stats. The
mean estimated α is 0.46, and the median is 0.49, both of which are in line with Fisman et al.’s
(2007) interpretative definition of “fair-mindedness”. Interestingly however, the distribution
appears to be tri-modal with large spikes at 0, 0.5, and 1. Overall, 366 subjects (34.7%)
have an α between 0.45 and 0.55, while just 75 (7%) have α > 0.95. Again, we decompose
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the α distributions with socio-demographic data in figure III.6. The results are striking in
that the means are very close to 0.5 with tight confidence bounds.
Figure III.6: Estimated Mean Alpha (α) by Subgroup

Dots indicate mean values, circles indicate 25th and 75th percentiles, bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for means

P-values for the distributional tests on α are shown in table III.2, column 5. The tests
were calculated the same way as above. As above, there are fewer differences in distribution
then there are differences in means. Further, 10 out of the 22 subgroups exhibit statistical
significance, although again, no corrections were made for multiple testing.

III.4

Charity Selection

Since Eckel and Grossman (1996), standard experimental practice has been to give to
actual charities. However, within these experiments there is often not enough data to comment on charity preference. Several studies offer no choice at all (e.g. Davis et al. 2005).
Furthermore, in studies that offer no choice, several conceal the charitable organization.
Harrison and Johnson did not identify their charity (the ACLU of South Carolina) in their
83

Table III.2: Pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests by Subgroup
Variable
Male
Less than HS
HS Diploma
Some College
College
Age<=37
Age 38-50
Age 51-60
White (Non-Hispanic)
African American
Hispanic/Latino
Lower Income
Middle Income
Upper Income
Employed
Unemployed
Retired
Disabled
Homemaker
Never Married
Married
Separated, etc.

Rho (ρ)
D
P-Value
0.0399
0.778
0.2307 0.014**
0.0669
0.604
0.0566
0.538
0.0849
0.112
0.2504 0.00***
0.0945
0.092
0.048
0.701
0.0823
0.091
0.0923
0.366
0.1144 0.037**
0.0699
0.239
0.0953 0.019**
0.1439 0.00***
0.0646
0.228
0.1317
0.241
0.1039 0.018**
0.0915
0.322
0.1245
0.183
0.1082
0.067
0.0836
0.056
0.1148 0.009***

Alpha (α)
D
P-Value
0.986
0.013**
0.1833
0.086
0.1515
0.006***
0.0549
0.577
0.0607
0.448
-0.1753
0.001***
0.0854
0.161
0.0343
0.957
0.2195
0.00***
0.1308
0.069
0.2161
0.00***
0.1073
0.014**
0.0963
0.017**
0.1344
0.00***
0.0691
0.167
0.1042
0.516
0.0749
0.182
0.1565
0.01***
0.0864
0.606
0.1367
0.009***
0.0783
0.086
0.0606
0.428

Note: Comparison group is all subjects not in the specified subgroup, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05

experiment, but afforded subjects the opportunity to examine the check written. Similarly,
Buchheit and Parsons (2006) disguise the name of the charitable organization. Furthermore,
in papers with choices, the choice at hand is necessarily reflective of the actual choice one
makes in charitable giving. For instance, donors inMcDowell et al. (2013) are only given a
choice of two charities. In what has become something of a standard, Eckel and Grossman
(2003) provide a list of ten charities to choose from. They note that:
The charities were selected to reflect as broad a range of services and client groups
as possible. The sample included international charities (African Christian Relief, Doctors Without Borders USA, and Feed The Children); national charities
(I Have A Dream Foundation); and local organizations (Women’s Haven of Tar84

rant County and American Red Cross, Tarrant County Chapter). The charities
covered health (AIDS Outreach Center and Cancer Care Services); environmental
(Earth Share Texas); and social service charities (YMCA of Arlington). Charities
were selected from the Texas State Employee Charitable Campaign booklet for
1997, which was provided to state employees during the workplace charity campaign. All charities included in the booklet meet state tax eligibility standards.
A brief description of each charity was given to the subjects, taken verbatim from
the Texas State Employee Charitable Campaign booklet.
(Eckel and Grossman 2003)
Italics are my own. Other charitable giving papers following this procedure include
Grossman et al. (2012), Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2013), and Harrison and Phillips (2013).
We account for these previous restrictions of choice by allowing subjects to not only select
from a markedly broader list of charities, but also by allowing them the option to switch
their charitable choice once they know the rules of the game.
Table III.3: Selected Categories and Causes
Category
N
Animals
328
Arts, Culture, & Humanities 42
Education
131
Environment
65
Health
298
Human Services
307
International
31
Public Benefit
26
Religion
93

Top Cause
N
Rights,Welfare, & Services
272
Performing Arts
19
Other Programs & Services
101
Protection & Conservation
59
Medical Research
109
Food Banks & Distribution
97
Development & Relief Services 13
Advocacy & Civil Rights
12
Media & Broadcasting
29

Given our diverse subject pool, it follows that subjects have a wide range of charitable
concerns. Table III.3 gives information on the distribution of selected types and the most
popular cause within each type. The three most popular charitable categories are Animals,
Human Services, and Health, respectively. Three divisions which by conventional wisdom,
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rely on very different donor types11 .
Figure III.7: Word Cloud of Selected Charities

Excluded Words: Association, for, foundation, in, institute, of, the, to

Of course, the universe of selected charities within these categories presents even finer and
more diverse bins. As a means of description, figure III.7 displays a word cloud comprised
of the names of every selected charity in our dataset. Clearly the most prominent words
are related to our top categories (e.g. Rescue, Research and Cancer ), but an interesting
observation is also the high number of geographic indicators in the cloud (e.g. Southeastern,
Greenville, Downtown).
11

We have more data on charitable selection than structural estimates as most subjects classified as not
completing the experiment still selected a charity (N=1321 ).
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III.4.1

Rationality Across Type

Above, we noted that subjects exhibit rational, utility maximizing behavior. We build
on this analysis further by asking the follow-up question: does this rationality differ across
charity type? By way of example, we ask whether a subject who prefers to donate to charities
supporting education is more consistent in those charitable choices (as indicated by CCEI
score) than one who donates to religious causes? In this way, we follow the framework of
Choi et al. (2014).
Figure III.8: Distributions of CCEI Scores

Figure III.8 illustrates the distributions of these scores across all charitable categories.
First we note that every type of charity has a mean CCEI greater than 0.84. Further, while
that leaves the door open for some slight variation in means, the distributions of rationality
are all very similar.
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Table III.4: Correlation between CCEI and Selected Category (OLS)
Category
Arts, Culture & Humanities

Coefficient
0.0414***
(0.0140)
Education
-0.0291*
(0.0150)
Environment
0.00620
(0.0179)
Health
0.00225
(0.0108)
Human Services
-0.00445
(0.0109)
International
0.0264
(0.0260)
Public Benefit
0.00210
(0.0297)
Religion
-0.00179
(0.0207)
Constant
0.884***
(0.00730)
Observations
1051
R2
0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We continue to explore this observation using OLS in table III.4, where only one category
(Arts, Culture & Humanities) exhibits significantly more rationality than the reference group
(Animals). Kolmogorov-Smirnov testing confirms this difference (p = 0.046).
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Figure III.9: CES Parameter Distributions Across Charity Types
(a) Estimated Mean α̂

(b) Estimated Median ρ̂
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III.4.2

Structural Estimates Across Type

Given the rationality exhibited both throughout the dataset and within specific charitable
types, we follow the logic from the previous section and examine estimated parameters across
charity type.
Again, we compare the distributions of the key parameters (namely ρ and α) across
charitable categories. Figure III.9 shows the distributions of our imputed parameters. An
observation of note is that there appears to be more within category variation than across
category variation.
Figure III.10: Classifying Subjects’ Preference over Own Income

The bars indicate the percentage of subjects in each cell.
We classify a subject as fair-minded if 0.45 < α̂n < 0.55; a subject is classified as selfish if α̂n > 0.95

Using Fisman et al.’s 2015 definitions of fair-mindedness and selfishness, we further compare α̂ distributions in figure III.10. Interestingly enough, the givers to religious charitable
causes have the highest number of selfish participants.
We further examine a subject’s equity-efficiency trade offs by means of ρ̂ distributions
in figure III.11. Again, Religious causes provide interesting insight into motives for giving,
where givers’ preferences for equality vastly outnumber those who are efficiency-focused.
Compare this to givers of Public Benefit causes, where we see almost the exact opposite.
Public Benefit Charities (e.g. The United Way) are the only category which efficiency-focused
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Figure III.11: Classifying Subjects’ Preference over Total Income

The bars indicate the percentage of subjects in each cell. We classify a subject as equality focused if ρ̂n < 0; a subject is
classified as efficiency focused if ρ̂n > 0

subjects outnumber those who are equality focused.

III.5

Concluding Remarks

This paper examines motives for giving, and further decomposes those motives based on
where subjects actually prefer to donate.
Our study concerns an experimental design that is strongly informed by theory. In doing
so, we create a rich data set that allows us to impose the structure of a standard utility
function (CES) to better understand these motives.
The benefits of this design are manifold. In particular, we are able to estimate parameters
at the individual level, and thereby comment on full parameter distributions, rather than
simple sample averages.
Further, decomposing by charity is a necessary step to build on previous literature.
Rather than rely on conventional wisdom, we find that differences within outnumber differences across demographic and charity types. In doing so, we reveal empirical evidence for
how charities can best target potential donors.
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As such, our paper speaks to multiple literatures including public and behavioral economics, and structural econometrics. Of course, more work in this area is needed, and this
paper is merely the first in a series of rich questions to be asked. In forthcoming projects, we
aim to further disentangle motives for giving and better inform policy by adding extra dimensions to the charitable choice such as highlighting individual receivers within a charitable
organization.
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Chapter IV
Summary and Personal Reflection
In a recent conversation...
...with a colleague, he lamented the tendency of economics experiments to attempt to answer
several questions at once—a practice at odds with other experimental sciences such as chemistry and physics. I agree with this standpoint and note that this tendency is particularly
severe when we forsake simplicity in pursuit of a magnum opus.
And yet, when my advisor asked me to reflect on what I’ve learned over the course of
my graduate work, I immediately lost sight of my own advice. I began to draft (what I
hoped was) an irreverent and holistic economic model of dissertation writing. In it, I quoted
luminaries such as Ackerloff, Friedman, and Varian; and used words like stochastic and
lexicographic.
Those words are not in this draft. In the former, I neglected to reflect. Reflect on
what areas of research interest me, why they do, and what I’ve learned from them. Most
importantly, I neglected to reflect on who I am as a scholar.
This reflection is surprisingly difficult. One of the great joys of an economics dissertation
is it can be structured to highlight a broad set of research skills. However, this can make it
hard to draw unifying insight from the work as a whole.
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What follows is the story of my experience writing the dissertation. While the results
of my research are presented in the preceding chapters, here I aim to focus on the lessons
gleaned from conducting the research, replete with its associated laurels and hurdles.

IV.1

Implicit Bias

I had been vaguely aware of the concept of implicit bias as it grew in the cultural consciousness. I had read Blink (Gladwell, 2005), and I had seen the episodes of Oprah. In spite
of this, I didn’t become interested in it as an area of research until the fall of 2012, when my
father happened to be in town for a conference on employment law.
One day, I met him for lunch and he began telling me about his experience taking an
IAT a few sessions earlier. “I could feel myself slowing down” he was saying. Fresh off my
first graduate field courses in experimental, I was struck by what I viewed as several flaws
with this comment.
While my goals in writing the paper have become more nuanced since then, many of those
insights are still in chapter 1: the differences between cheap talk and incentivized action, the
role of marketplace decisions, the vectors of skills that various tasks could be highlighting.
Outside of the paper’s own results, a great lesson here is not only that economic inspiration can come from anywhere, but also the dividends that payoff in wheting and honing a
thesis through the process of workshopping and presenting.
Having said that, the paper was not without its difficulties. From the stance of implementation, my subject pool was not as balanced as I had envisioned in designing the experiment.
However, there is no perfect lab, and this realization was actually quite liberating for me.
On the analysis side, this chapter has null results which come with their own provisos and
limitations. After relentlessly scrutinizing and torturing the data I have come to believe that
these are true null results, and learned many things in the process about how to better ask
and answer questions. I think my committee would want me to stress the importance of
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asking questions that aren’t mere statistical exercises, but look for economic significance,
and in doing so learning to ask questions where even null results are interesting results.

IV.2

Girls’ School

In the fall of 2013, I was called into a meeting with my advisor and the (then) director
of graduate studies. Given all my neuroses, I assumed something terrible was about to
happen. That “something terrible” was the girls’ school paper, what is now chapter 2 of this
dissertation, and my first coauthorship.
While any first is bound to have a learning curve1 , perhaps my most valuable lessons
came from this paper’s “seconds,” by which I mean the follow-up experiments. Though not
part of chapter 2, per-se, this experience offers a microcosm of dissertation lessons as a whole.
These follow-up experiments had elements that were both extremely fortunate and extremely lacking. For instance, our IRB application was accepted without revisions, but our
subject recruitment was underwhelming. It is not my aim to disparage any of the parties
involved, or even comment on the merits of lab versus field environments. Rather I wish
to pay deference to that fact that, whether providential or ill-fated, any experimental endeavor is replete with chance. Experimentation is necessarily a process where the outcome
is unknown, and as such, makes the researcher susceptible to Murphy’s Law. In course, I’ve
found that there are great benefits to additional groundwork and preparedness.

IV.3

Charitable Giving

Experimental economics is a top-heavy process. Rather than cleaning and coding data,
we spend a great deal of our time tweaking and adjusting designs, such that when the data
are ready the analysis tends to be fairly straightforward. I found this to be the case even in
my third chapter, which was by far the most structural of the three.
1

Including the importance of debugging code, where special thanks are due to Glenn Harrison
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In many ways, this chapter was the synthesis of what I had already been assimilating
while writing the dissertation. Along with my coauthors I was able to refine the question
to fill an interesting hole in the literature, I was perpetually writing, even during some of
(what felt like) the more stagnant experimental design phases, and I learned to better lean
on the advice and assistance of others.
In the chapter’s opening footnote, I remark that the paper is part of a larger, ongoing
project. While this is particularly true with regards to “The Richness of Giving,” the same
could be said for the research process as a whole.

IV.4

Concluding Remarks

Though we often forget from the solitude of our laptops, this reflection serves to remind
me how collaborative academe is. Not only the act of coauthorship itself, but the entire
research process: brainstorming ideas, workshopping papers, debugging, writing, editing.
This collaboration is compounded in economics experiments where we need assistance to
run the damn things.
A common thread from my lessons in collaboration is the maintenance of perspective.
Whether it is the context of a broader literature in your problem, how to best communicate
that problem to others, or just proper respect paid to those you collaborated with in the
first place.
In this vein, as I stand on the precipice of my doctorate, I am very grateful for the support
of my Chair, Dr. Susan Laury. My committee members Drs. Charles Courtemanche, John
A. List, and Michael K. Price. Non-committee coauthors Drs. Shachar Kariv and Kurt
E. Schnier, as well as numerous peers, assistants, funding agencies and anyone else whose
invaluable assistance made “Three Essays on Social Issues in Experimental Economics” a
possibility. Many kind thanks are owed to all.
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Appendix A) IAT Screenshots
On Screen Instructions

Concept (Facial) Sorting
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Attribute (Word) Sorting

Grouped Sorting (Highly Associated)
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Grouped Sorting (Less Associated)
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Appendix B
In this appendix, I adapt the language of Lazear et al. (2012) and include formal definitions of Reluctant, Willing, and Non-sharers
Definition 1. A Willing Sharer (i) shares a positive amount in a sharing environment
and (ii) prefers to be in such an environment when w = w0 .
(i) arg maxx∈[0,w] U (1, x, w − x) < w
(ii) maxx∈[0,w] U (1, x, w − x) > U (0, w, 0)
Definition 2. A Reluctant Sharer (i) shares a positive amount when in a sharing environment but (ii) prefers to not have the option when there is no financial reward to sharing.
(i) arg maxx∈[0,w] U (1, x, w − x) < w
(ii) maxx∈[0,w] U (1, x, w − x) < U (0, w, 0)
Definition 3. A Non-Sharer (i) does not share, even if the environment allows for it.
(i) arg maxx∈[0,w] U (1, x, w − x) = w
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Appendix C) Subject Instructions
Treatment: Pictures, Costly Sorting
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group A Instructions
In the first part of this experiment, you have been given the choice of whether or not to
participate in the following activity. That is, participating in this activity is optional.
You have been randomly paired with the participant displayed on your screen. This
person is completing a different task that may include different payments, and does not know
that he or she is participating with you. If you choose to participate, you will be given $10. It is
your task to decide how much to distribute between yourself and the person with whom you are
paired. In other words, you must decide how much money, between $0 and $10 to give to the
other person and how much to keep for yourself. You may select any amount between $0 and
$10. For example, you may decide to give $9 to the other person and keep $1 for yourself, or
you may instead decide to give $1 to the other person and keep $9 for yourself. If you choose to
participate, I will explain the activity to the other person. That is, the other person will learn the
rules of the allocation task and the assigned amounts you assigned. He or she will not see your
picture. The assigned amounts will then be paid to both you, in addition to your show-up fees.
Moreover, you may decide to not participate in the above activity. If you choose this
option, you will receive a fixed amount of $9 (plus the $5 for participation). The other person
will receive $5 for participation. He or she will not receive any information about this activity.
Please indicate your choice on the sheet below.
Decision Sheet
I wish to (circle one) Participate/Not Participate
If you are participating, please indicate
Amount of money to give to the other person: _________________
Amount of money to keep for yourself : _________________
(these two quantities must sum up to $10.00)
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Treatment: Pictures, Costless Sorting
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group A Instructions
In the first part of this experiment, you have been given the choice of whether or not to
participate in the following activity. That is, participating in this activity is optional.
You have been randomly paired with the participant displayed on your screen. This
person is completing a different task that may include different payments, and does not know
that he or she is participating with you. If you choose to participate, you will be given $10. It is
your task to decide how much to distribute between yourself and the person with whom you are
paired. In other words, you must decide how much money, between $0 and $10 to give to the
other person and how much to keep for yourself. You may select any amount between $0 and
$10. For example, you may decide to give $9 to the other person and keep $1 for yourself, or
you may instead decide to give $1 to the other person and keep $9 for yourself. If you choose to
participate, I will explain the activity to the other person. That is, the other person will learn the
rules of the allocation task and the assigned amounts you assigned. He or she will not see your
picture. The assigned amounts will then be paid to both you, in addition to your show-up fees.
Moreover, you may decide to not participate in the above activity. If you choose this
option, you will receive a fixed amount of $10 (plus the $5 for participation). The other person
will receive $5 for participation. He or she will not receive any information about this activity.
Please indicate your choice on the sheet below.
Decision Sheet
I wish to (circle one) Participate/Not Participate
If you are participating, please indicate
Amount of money to give to the other person: _________________
Amount of money to keep for yourself : _________________
(these two quantities must sum up to $10.00)
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Treatment Pictures, No Sorting
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group A Instructions
You have been randomly paired with the participant displayed on your screen. In this
part of the experiment, you will be given $10. It is your task to decide how much to distribute
between yourself and the person with whom you are paired. In other words, you must decide
how much money, between $0 and $10 to give to the other person and how much to keep for
yourself. You may select any amount between $0 and $10. For example, you may decide to
give $9 to the other person and keep $1 for yourself, or you may instead decide to give $1 to the
other person and keep $9 for yourself. After you make your decision, I will explain the activity
to the other person, that is, the other person will learn the rules of the allocation task and the
assigned amounts you assigned. He or she will not see your picture. The assigned amounts will
then be paid to both you, in addition to your show-up fees.
Decision Sheet
Amount of money to give to the other person: _________________
Amount of money to keep for yourself : _________________
(these two quantities must sum up to $10.00)
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Treatment: No Information, Costly Sorting
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group A Instructions
In the first part of this experiment, you have been given the choice of whether or not to
participate in the following activity. That is, participating in this activity is optional.
You have been randomly paired with a participant in this room. This person is
completing a different task that may include different payments, and does not know that he or
she is participating with you. If you choose to participate, you will be given $10. It is your task
to decide how much to distribute between yourself and the person with whom you are paired. In
other words, you must decide how much money, between $0 and $10 to give to the other person
and how much to keep for yourself. You may select any amount between $0 and $10. For
example, you may decide to give $9 to the other person and keep $1 for yourself, or you may
instead decide to give $1 to the other person and keep $9 for yourself. If you choose to
participate, I will explain the activity to the other person. That is, the other person will learn the
rules of the allocation task and the assigned amounts you assigned. He or she will not learn who
you are. The assigned amounts will then be paid to both you, in addition to your show-up fees.
Moreover, you may decide to not participate in the above activity. If you choose this
option, you will receive a fixed amount of $9 (plus the $5 for participation). The other person
will receive $5 for participation. He or she will not receive any information about this activity.
Please indicate your choice on the sheet below.
Decision Sheet
I wish to (circle one) Participate/Not Participate
If you are participating, please indicate
Amount of money to give to the other person: _________________
Amount of money to keep for yourself : _________________
(these two quantities must sum up to $10.00)
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Treatment: No Information, Costless Sorting
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group A Instructions
In the first part of this experiment, you have been given the choice of whether or not to
participate in the following activity. That is, participating in this activity is optional.
You have been randomly paired with a participant in this room. This person is
completing a different task that may include different payments, and does not know that he or
she is participating with you. If you choose to participate, you will be given $10. It is your task
to decide how much to distribute between yourself and the person with whom you are paired. In
other words, you must decide how much money, between $0 and $10 to give to the other person
and how much to keep for yourself. You may select any amount between $0 and $10. For
example, you may decide to give $9 to the other person and keep $1 for yourself, or you may
instead decide to give $1 to the other person and keep $9 for yourself. If you choose to
participate, I will explain the activity to the other person. That is, the other person will learn the
rules of the allocation task and the assigned amounts you assigned. He or she will not learn who
you are. The assigned amounts will then be paid to both you, in addition to your show-up fees.
Moreover, you may decide to not participate in the above activity. If you choose this
option, you will receive a fixed amount of $10 (plus the $5 for participation). The other person
will receive $5 for participation. He or she will not receive any information about this activity.
Please indicate your choice on the sheet below.
Decision Sheet
I wish to (circle one) Participate/Not Participate
If you are participating, please indicate
Amount of money to give to the other person: _________________
Amount of money to keep for yourself : _________________
(these two quantities must sum up to $10.00)
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Treatment: No Information, No Sorting
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group A Instructions
You have been randomly paired with a participant in this room. In this part of the
experiment, you will be given $10. It is your task to decide how much to distribute between
yourself and the person with whom you are paired. In other words, you must decide how much
money, between $0 and $10 to give to the other person and how much to keep for yourself. You
may select any amount between $0 and $10. For example, you may decide to give $9 to the
other person and keep $1 for yourself, or you may instead decide to give $1 to the other person
and keep $9 for yourself. After you make your decision, I will explain the activity to the other
person, that is, the other person will learn the rules of the allocation task and the assigned
amounts you assigned. He or she will not learn who you are. The assigned amounts will then be
paid to both you, in addition to your show-up fees.
Decision Sheet
Amount of money to give to the other person: _________________
Amount of money to keep for yourself : _________________
(these two quantities must sum up to $10.00)
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Receiver Instructions (Constant Across Treatments)
Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate. This is an experiment in two parts. We are
interested in how people make decisions in social situations. Please read the instructions
carefully, as your task may not be the same as those around you. During the session please do
not talk or communicate with the other participants. If you have a question, please raise your
hand and a research assistant will come answer it.
Everyone has already earned $5 for showing up. Additionally, you may have an
opportunity to earn more. We will pay you privately in cash at the end of the session. None of
the other participants will know the amount you have earned.
Group B Instructions
In the first part of this experiment, you are asked to complete the attached questionnaire.
You will earn money based on how you answer these questions. After finishing, you will be
asked to participate in an additional activity. The additional activity will not affect your payment
in this part of the experiment.
In this questionnaire, you will be presented with a table that contains information on 10 different
decisions that you must make. For each of the 10 decisions you must select either option 1 or
option 2. The outcome of each option depends on the role of a 10-sided die. You will be paid
based on your decisions in this questionnaire and partly on chance. Below is an example of the
first three decisions you will make:
Decision
Option 1
Option 2
Roll 1 for $2
or 2-10 for $1.60
Roll 1 for $3.85
or 2-10 for $0.10
1
Roll 1,2 for $2
or 3-10 for $1.60
Roll 1,2 for $3.85
or 3-10 for $0.10
2
Roll 1-3 for $2
or 4-10 for $1.60
Roll 1-3 for $3.85
or 4-10 for $0.10
3
Here is how I will pay you for this activity: I will first roll the 10-sided die to determine which
decisions will receive payment and then re-roll the 10-sided die to determine your final
earnings based on whether or not you selected option 1 or 2. All die rolls will be conducted
after you have completed the experiment.
In the example above, suppose that I roll the 10-sided die and it lands on 1. Then the first row
will be selected for payment. Now supposed I reroll the die and it lands on 6. If this is true you
will receive $1.60 if you had selected Option 1 and $0.10 if you had selected Option 2.
However, if the 10-sided die lands on 1 you will receive $2.00 if you had selected Option 1 and
$3.85 if you had selected Option 2.
Please indicate your decision for each of the 10 rows on the opposite side of this sheet:
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Please indicate your choice by circling either option 1 or 2 in the far right column. Only choose one option for each decision:

Decision

Option 1

Option 2

My Choice

1

Roll 1 for $2

or

2-10 for $1.60

Roll 1 for $3.85

or

2-10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

2

Roll 1,2 for $2

or

3-10 for $1.60

Roll 1,2 for $3.85

or

3-10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

3

Roll 1-3 for $2

or

4-10 for $1.60

Roll 1-3 for $3.85

or

4-10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

4

Roll 1-4 for $2

or

5-10 for $1.60

Roll 1-4 for $3.85

or

5-10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

5

Roll 1-5 for $2

or

6-10 for $1.60

Roll 1-5 for $3.85

or

6-10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

6

Roll 1-6 for $2

or

7-10 for $1.60

Roll 1-6 for $3.85

or

7-10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

7

Roll 1-7 for $2

or

8-10for $1.60

Roll 1-7 for $3.85

or

8-10for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

8

Roll 1-8 for $2

or

9,10 for $1.60

Roll 1-8 for $3.85

or

9,10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

9

Roll 1-9 for $2

or

10 for $1.60

Roll 1-9 for $3.85

or

10 for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2

10

Roll 1-10 for $2

or

- for $1.60

Roll 1-10 for $3.85

or

- for $0.10

Option 1

Option 2
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Appendix D) Demographic Survey

Demographic Survey
Below are several questions relating to your background. Your answers here will
help us in conducting statistical analysis. Your name will not be matched with
your responses and all information will be kept confidential. Please indicate if you
prefer not to answer a particular question or if you would like to leave the study at
any time. Please answer the questions honestly and to the best of your ability.
5) Have you participated in an
economics experiment previously?
□ Yes
□ No
□ Don’t Know
□ Prefer Not to Answer
6) What is your current year in
school?
□ Freshman
□ Sophomore
□ Junior
□ Senior
□ Graduate Student
□ I am not currently enrolled
in school
□ Prefer Not to Answer

1) What is your age? _________
2) What gender do you identify with:
□ Male
□ Female
□ Prefer Not to Answer
3) Which of these groups best
describes you?
□ White
□ Black or African-American
□ Hispanic
□ American Indian or Alaska
Native
□ Asian
□ Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander
□ Other
□ Prefer Not to Answer

7) What is your GPA?
□ ____________
□ Prefer Not to Answer

4) What religion do you currently
identify with?
□ Catholic
□ Protestant
□ Muslim
□ Jewish
□ Agnostic
□ No Religion
□ Don’t Know
□ Prefer Not to Answer
□ Other

8)What is your Major?
_____________________
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Appendix E
Scatter plots of IAT score and Amount Passed by Race and Bias of Dictator

In this appendix we start by looking at giving in finer bins in the photo treatments.
Specifically the bias of the dictator. Here our definition of bias is IAT scores beyond ±0.15.
The greatest difference in means exists between passing to the same and other for those
holding an Anti-Black bias. This difference is not significant.
Table 1: Average Amounts Passed By Bias and Equivalence of Race
IAT Threshlod

Same Race
Other Race
Avg. Pass
Total Obs

Anti-White
2.964
(1.971, n=28)
2.742
(2.756, n=31)
2.847
59

None
2.179
(2.342, n=28)
2.600
(2.591, n=10)
2.289
38

Anti-Black
2.516
(2.206, n=48)
3.233
(1.960, n=30)
2.792
78

Std. Deviations & Observations in Parentheses
IAT cutoffs at bias thresholds of ≤ −0.15 and ≥ 0.15

Next we look at giving in the context of a double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971). This more
flexible model, displayed in table 2 allows two separate processes for choosing to stay in,
and how much one participates conditional on staying in. However, in order to specify these
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processes, it is necessary that I restrict the sample to those sessions with a sorting option
(n=126). Even with this increased flexibility, IAT is still neither a significant predictor of
dictator giving nor sorting.
Table 2: The IAT’s Effect on Percent Shared Hurdle Model
Panel A: Hurdle
Variable
IAT D-score

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0584
(0.116)

0.107
(0.118)
0.340
(0.271)
-0.559**
(0.253)

0.108
(0.119)
0.338
(0.271)
-0.558**
(0.253)
-0.0440
(0.236)

0.428***
(0.116)

0.525**
(0.257)

0.550*
(0.290)

0.154
(0.226)
0.350
(0.276)
-0.561**
(0.253)
-0.0535
(0.239)
-0.129
(0.533)
0.552*
(0.290)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.363
(0.311)

-0.383
(0.303)
-0.487
(0.696)
0.878
(0.606)

-0.381
(0.300)
-0.554
(0.692)
0.922
(0.600)
-0.589
(0.570)

Receiver is Black
Receiver is Same Gender
Costly Sorting
IATxPassedBlack
Constant
Panel B: Above
Variable
IAT D-score

-0.976
(0.611)
Receiver is Black
-0.735
(0.702)
Receiver is Same Gender
1.029*
(0.604)
Costly Sorting
-0.609
(0.564)
IATxPassedBlack
1.600
(1.412)
Constant
3.251*** 3.167*** 3.510*** 3.555***
(0.345)
(0.636)
(0.696)
(0.688)
Sigma
2.306*** 2.265*** 2.246*** 2.223***
(0.264)
(0.256)
(0.252)
(0.247)
Observations
126
126
126
126
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix F
STUDENT INSTRUCTIONS
There are two separate games that you are going to play today. You will first play Game 1 and
then proceed to Game 2. Listed below is a description of the two games and the tasks/decisions
you will make. After you have completed both games we will flip a coin to determine which game
you will receive payment. You will only receive payment for one of the two games.
GAME 1
In game one you will be presented with a folder that contains information on 10 different decisions
that you must make. For each of the 10 decisions you must select either option A or option B.
The outcome of each option depends on the role of a 10-sided die. The decision task is illustrated
two different ways. At the top of each page you will see a pie chart that graphically illustrates the
probable outcomes of your decision. Listed below the pie chart is a verbal description of the game.
To determine the outcome of the game the study leader will roll a 10-sided die with your payment
depending on the die number. After you have made all 10 of your decisions, the study leader will
first roll the 10-sided die to determine which of the 10 decisions you will receive payment and then
re-roll the 10-sided die to determine your final earnings based on whether or not you selected
option A or B. All die rolls will be conducted after you have completed both Game 1 and 2.
Below is an example of the decision task you will make:

$10.00

$7.00

$2.00

$4.00

Option A
$10 if throw of die is 1 – 4
$2 if throw of die is 5 – 10

Option B
$7 if throw of die is 1 – 4
$4 if throw if die is 5 – 10

Suppose that the study leader rolls the 10-sided die and it lands on 6. If this is true you will receive
$2.00 of you had selected Option A and $4.00 if you had selected Option B. However, if the 10sided die lands on 3 you will receive $10.00 if you had selected Option A and $7.00 if you had
selected Option B. The color-coded pie chart illustrates how probable each outcome is, the larger
the area the more probable the outcome. For instance, under Option A there is a 40% chance that
you will earn $10.00 and a 60% percent chance you will earn $2.00. Under Option B there is a
40% chance you will earn $7.00 and a 60% chance you will earn $4.00.
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GAME 2
In Game 2 you will be asked to under hand lob (you must under hand lob) a tennis ball ten times
into a basket that is 10 feet away. You must remain behind the line when tossing each of the tennis
balls. Before playing the game you must decide which payment method you wish to receive.
Under option A you will receive $2 for every tennis ball that you successfully under hand lob into
the basket. Under option B you will be randomly paired with one of your fellow students and if
you lob more tennis balls in the basket then they do you will receive $8 for each tennis ball that
exceeds the number lobbed into the basket by your competitor. At no time during the game will
you know which student in your class is the student you have been paired with; you will be
informed of your earnings upon completion of both Game 1 and 2. For instance, if you lob 6 tennis
balls into the basket and your paired competitor lobs 4 tennis balls into the basket you will earn
(6-4)*$8=2*$8=$16 in the game. However, if they had lobbed 6 tennis balls in the basket as well
you would earn (6-6)*$8=0*$8=$0. In the case that your competitor lobs more tennis balls in the
trash can than you, you will earn $0 (it is not possible to lose money).
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Student Survey
Student Number____________
1. How old are you? ________________________
2. What grade are you in at school? _______________________
3. Please circle your gender.
a. Girl
b. Boy
4. What sports teams have you played on in the past year (it is ok to write “none” if you
don’t play any sports)?

5. Please circle all of the math courses that you have taken, including your current math
course.
a. 6th grade math
b. pre‐algebra
c. algebra I
d. geometry
e. algebra II
f. pre‐calculus
g. calculus
h. statistics
i. AP calculus
j. economics
6. How much time do you spend doing homework every day? ____________________
7. If you had a math test coming up, how many hours would you spend studying for it?
____________________
8. How many AP courses have you taken? ______________________
9. How many AP courses have you taken in math or science? _____________________
10. On average how many hours do you spend with a parent every day? __________
11. How many times a week do you eat dinner as a family? __________
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Appendix G
Complete List of Charitable Organizations
Civil War Trust
Western Reserve Historical Society
George Washington’s Mount Vernon
Center for Jewish History
The New York Public Library
The Friends of the Saint Paul Public Library
Cause: Museums
Chrysler Museum of Art
Walking Mountains Science Center
Santa Barbara Museum of Art
Los Angeles County Museum of Art
Children’s Museum of Richmond
Honolulu Museum of Art
Missouri History Museu
Children’s Museum of Houston
American Museum of Natural History
Metropolitan Museum of Art
Cause: Performing Arts
Houston Ballet
La Jolla Playhouse
Fractured Atlas
Colorado Springs Fine Arts Center
Paul Taylor Dance Foundation
Brooklyn Academy of Music
On the Boards
San Francisco Ballet
Boston Lyric Opera
The Raymond F. Kravis Center for the
Performing Arts
Cause: Public Broadcasting and Media
Vermont Public Radio
NPR
Center for Investigative Reporting
StoryCorps
Maine Public Broadcasting Network
Twin Cities Public Television
New Hampshire Public Radio
Graywolf Press
Texas Public Radio
KUOW Puget Sound Public Radio
Category: Education

Category: Animals
Cause: Animal Rights, Welfare, and
Services
Greenville Humane Society
American Veterinary Medical Foundation
Southeastern Guide Dogs
Banfield Charitable Trust
Puppies Behind Bars
Michigan Anti-Cruelty Society
San Francisco SPCA
Days End Farm Horse Rescue
Peggy Adams Animal Rescue League
Main Line Animal Rescue
Cause: Wildlife Conservation
Big Cat Rescue
Wildlife Conservation Network
WildAid
International Primate Protection League
Orangutan Foundation International
American Bird Conservancy
Pheasants Forever
Trout Unlimited
American Eagle Foundation
Pollinator Partnership
Cause: Zoos and Aquariums
Clearwater Marine Aquarium
North Carolina Aquarium Society
Columbus Zoo and Aquarium
Houston Zoo
Texas State Aquarium
Birmingham Zoo
Detroit Zoological Society
National Aquarium, Baltimore
Cincinnati Zoo & Botanical Garden
The Philadelphia Zoo
Category: Arts, Culture, and Humanities
Cause: Libraries, Historical Societies and
Landmark Preservation
Archaeological Conservancy
The Seattle Public Library Foundation
Minnesota Historical Society
Louisville Free Public Library Foundation
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BELL
Category: Environment
Cause: Environmental Protection and
Conservation
North Cascades Institute
Rare
Living Lands and Waters
Alliance for the Great Lakes
World Resources Institute
The Sierra Club Foundation
Trees Atlanta
Texas Parks and Wildlife Foundation
Conservation Law Foundation
Teton Science Schools
Cause: Botanical Gardens, Parks, and
Nature Centers
Western Pennsylvania Conservancy
New England Wild Flower Society
San Francisco Parks Alliance
Grand Teton National Park Foundation
Golden Gate National Parks Conservancy
Naples Botanical Garden
Thomas Irvine Dodge Nature Center
World Forestry Center
Cincinnati Parks Foundation
The Battery Conservancy
Category: Health
Cause: Diseases, Disorders, and
Disciplines
United Cerebral Palsy of Greater Chicago
National Kidney Foundation of Michigan
Glaucoma Research Foundation
National Alopecia Areata Foundation
Cure Alzheimer’s Fund
Immune Deficiency Foundation
HelpHOPELive
Breast Cancer Connections
Children’s Organ Transplant Association
FSH Society
Cause: Patient and Family Support
Camp John Marc
Sharsheret
Make-a-Wish Foundation of the Texas Gulf
Coast and Louisiana
Camp Sunshine, Maine
Mercy Medical Airlift/Mercy Medial Angels

Cause: Universities, Graduate Schools,
and Technological Institutes
University of Delaware
Medical College of Wisconsin
Emory University
Northeastern University
Drexel University
New York University
Dartmouth College
Baylor University
Carnegie Mellon University
Cornell University
Cause: Private Elementary and
Secondary Schools
Epiphany School
The Kinkaid School
Pace Academy
KIPP DC
Grand Rapids Christian Schools
Kimball Union Academy
Mercersburg Academy
Wesleyan School
Abraham Joshua Heschel School
Harlem Academy
Cause: Private Liberal Arts Colleges
Davidson College
St. Olaf College
Claremont McKenna College
University of Puget Sound
Furman University
Wheaton College
Lafayette College
Gustavus Adolphus College
Wellesley College
Spelman College
Cause: Other Education Programs and
Services
Step Up For Students
DonorsChoose.org
Communities In Schools National Office
The Parent-Child Home Program
National Medical Fellowships
GreatSchools
I Know I Can
Small Steps Nurturing Center
The BISON Children’s Scholarship Fund
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Operation Access
Make-a-Wish Foundation of Masachusetts
and Rhode Island
Dream Foundation
Tom Coughlin Jay Fund Foundation
Boston Ronald McDonald House
Community Volunteers in Medicine
Cause: Treatment and Prevention
Services
International Planned Parenthood
Foundation/Western Hemisphere Region
St. Petersburg Free Clinic
Resource Center
Cenikor Foundation
Venice Family Clinic
Arlington Free Clinic
Wisconsin Women’s Health Foundation
Planned Parenthood of Maryland
Fan Free Clinic
Cause: Medical Research
Masonic Medical Research Laboratory
The Lustgarten Foundation for Pancreatic
Cancer Research
Breast Cancer Research Foundation
The Multiple Myeloma Research
Foundation
Sabin Vaccine Institute
Alliance for Aging Research
Cancer Research Institute
Sansum Diabetes Research Institute
Damon Runyon Cancer Research
Foundation
Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation
Category: Human Services
Cause: Children’s and Family Services
Forever Young Foundation
Harlem Children’s Zone
Cradles to Crayons
Mary’s Center
Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption
Martha’s Table
Jewish Family Service of San Diego
Families Forward
Emergency Family Assistance Association
Court Appointed Special Advocates of
Collin County

Cause: Youth Development, Shelter, and
Crisis Services
Do Something
Boys & Girls Clubs of Central Florida
Place of Hope
Girls Inc. of Omaha
Royal Family Kids
Big Brothers Big Sisters of Eastern Missouri
Harlem RBI
St. Anne’s
United Friends of the Children
Boys & Girls Clubs of Metropolitan Phoenix
Cause: Food Banks, Food Pantries, and
Food Distribution
Midwest Food Bank
The Billings Food Bank
Weld Food Bank
San Antonio Food Bank
Second Harvest Food Bank of North Central
Ohio
Central Illinois Foodbank
Second Harvest Food Bank of Northwest
Pennsylvania
Northern Illinois Food Bank
The Food Bank of Lower Fairfield
Ozarks Food Harvest
Cause: Multipurpose Human Service
Organizations
New York Cares
Good Sports
National Fallen Firefighters Foundation
Higher Ground Sun Valley
Special Olympics Arizona
United States Soccer Foundation
100 Club of Arizona
Armed Services YMCA
Adaptive Sports Association
All Hands Volunteers
Cause: Homeless Services
Preble Street
Homeless Emergency Project
Durham Rescue Mission
The Lord’s Place
SOME
Abode Services
Safe Haven Family Shelter

117

Feed My Starving Children
Brother’s Brother Foundation
Project HOPE
MedShare International
Cause: Foreign Charity Support
Organizations
Palestine Children’s Relief Fund
CommonHope
Hadassah, The Women’s Zionist
Organization of America
The Citizens Foundation, USA
American-Israeli Cultural Foundation
Sankara Eye Foundation, USA
American Society for Yad Vashem
Fonkoze USA
BRAC USA
Solid Rock International
Category: Public Benefit
Cause: Advocacy and Civil Rights
Equal Justice Initiative
Chicago Foundation for Women
Physicians for Reproductive Health
Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and
Liberty
Compassion & Choices
Injured Marine Semper Fi Fund
NumbersUSA
Institute for Justice
National Immigration Law Center
Freedom From Religion Foundation
Cause: Fundraising Organizations
Charities Aid Foundation America
Robin Hood Foundation
Jewish Community Federation of San
Francisco, the Peninsula, Marin and Sonoma
Counties
Greater Kalamazoo United Way
Arthritis National Research Foundation
United Way of Summit County
United Way of Cass-Clay
The Rose Foundation for Communities and
the Environment
Elton John AIDS Foundation
AIDS United
Cause: Research and Public Policy
Institutions

Downtown Women’s Center
Primavera Foundation
The INN
Cause: Social Services
Emergency Outreach Colorado
Air Warrior Courage Foundation
Fisher House Foundation
Boca Helping Hands
Eva’s Village
Navy SEAL Foundation
Homes for Our Troops
Special Operations Warrior Foundation
Surrey Services for Seniors
REDF
Category: International
Cause: Development and Relief Services
Wings of Hope
Life in Abundance International
Aga Khan Foundation, USA
Child Aid
ECHO
Fistula Foundation
Kids Alive International
International Institute of Rural
Reconstruction (IIRR)
Kiva
GlobalGiving
Cause: International Peace, Security, and
Affairs
V-Day
Polaris Project
United Nations Foundation
Women’s Learning Partnership
StandWithUs
Shared Hope International
International Center for Journalists
Institute of International Education
Birthright Israel Foundation
Human Rights Watch
Cause: Humanitarian Relief Supplies
Books for Africa
Project C.U.R.E.
Heart to Heart International
Direct Relief
Matthew 25: Ministries
Outreach
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Rebuilding Together
Habitat for Humanity of Washington, D.C.
Enterprise Community Partners, Inc.
Cleveland Housing Network
Habitat for Humanity of Monroe County, IN
Habitat for Humanity of Omaha
Houston Habitat for Humanity
Category: Religion
Cause: Religious Activities
Mission Waco Mission World
Young Life
International Messengers
Urban Youth Impact
Commission To Every Nation
Hebrew Free Burial Association
Maoz Israel Ministries
Forward Edge International
Asian Access
Mission Arlington/Mission Metroplex
Cause: Religious Media and Broadcasting
Andrew Wommack Ministries
Ramesh Richard Evangelism and Church
Health
Educational Media Foundation
Lutheran Bible Translators
WAY Media, Inc.
Pioneer Bible Translators
Lamb & Lion Ministries
Billy Graham Evangelistic Association
SAT-7
Blue Ridge Broadcasting Corporation

RESULTS Educational Fund
Carnegie Institution for Science
Public Interest Projects
Center for Food Safety
North Carolina Agricultural Foundation
The Brookings Institution
Mount Desert Island Biological Laboratory
The Federalist Society for Law and Public
Policy Studies
Kentucky Youth Advocates
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
Cause: Community Foundations
The Community Foundation for Northeast
Florida
The Community Foundation of Louisville
Community Foundation of North Texas
Orange County Community Foundation
The Columbus Foundation
Parasol Tahoe Community Foundation
Community Foundation for Southeast
Michigan
Princeton Area Community Foundation
Community Foundation of Middle
Tennessee
Community Foundation of New Jersey
Cause: Community and Housing
Development
Habitat for Humanity of Greater Los
Angeles
Habitat for Humanity of East Bay
San Gabriel Valley Habitat for Humanity
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Appendix H
Experimental Screens and Instructions
Instructions (TEXT ONLY)
Welcome to the survey
Login code:______________
Please remember that participation in this survey is voluntary and you may skip over any questions that
you would prefer not to answer. You will not be identified in any reports on this study.
This is an experiment in decision‐making. Your payoffs will depend partly on your decisions and partly
on chance. Please pay careful attention to the instructions as a considerable amount of money is at
stake.
During the experiment we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of dollars. Your payoffs
will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated into dollars at the end of the experiment at the
following rate:
2 Tokens = 1 Dollar
You are free to stop at any time. If you do not complete the experiment now, you may return to
complete the experimental session at any time between now and 04‐01‐2016. If you do not complete
the experiment before then, you will not receive any payment. Details of how you will make decisions
and receive payments will be provided below.
This is an experiment in two stages. For stage one, you will be presented with information on several
charitable organizations taken from the website www.CharityNavigator.com; afterwards you will be
asked to select a preferred organization.
In stage two you will participate repeatedly in 50 independent decision problems that share a common
form. We next describe in detail the process that will be repeated in all decision problems and the
computer program that you will use to make your decisions.
In each decision problem you will be asked to allocate tokens between yourself and the charitable
organization you selected in the previous stage. We will refer to the tokens that you allocate to yourself
as tokens that you Hold, and tokes that you allocate to the chosen charity as Pass.
Charity navigator is a website that evaluates organizations which rely on public support and actively
solicit donations from the public. It rates organizations which file IRS Form 990 along several
dimensions and has been acclaimed by numerous publications as among the best or most useful
websites.
They have identified 9 charitable categories and several causes within each category. The table on the
next screen is adapted from the charity navigator website and contains information on the top ten
charities within each cause. Please review the information in this table carefully and select your most
preferred charity. If you like, you can also write in a different charity of your choice.
The Charity I select is___________
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Each choice will involve choosing a point on a line representing possible token allocations to you (Hold)
and to your charity (Pass). In each choice, you may choose any Hold / Pass pair that is on the line.
Examples of lines that you might face appear in the diagrams below. In each graph. Hold corresponds to
the vertical axis and Pass corresponds to the horizontal axis. The points on the diagonal lines in the
graphs represent possible token allocations to Hold (tokens to you) and Pass (tokens to the charity) that
you might choose.
By picking a point on the diagonal line, you choose how many tokens to hold for yourself and how many
to pass to the charity. You may select any allocation to Hold or Pass on that line.
If, for example, the diagonal line runs from 50 tokens on the Hold axis to 50 tokens on the Pass axis (See
Diagram 4), you could choose to hold all 50 tokens for yourself or pass all 50 tokens to the
To further illustrate, in the example below, choice A represents an allocation in which you hold y tokens
and pass x tokens. Thus if you chose this allocation you will keep y tokens for yourself and pass x tokens
to the charity. Another possible allocation is B, in which you hold w tokens and pass z to the charity.
Each of the 50 decision problems will start by having the computer select a diagonal line at random. All
of the lines that the computer will select will intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more tokens,
but will not intersect either axis at more than 100 tokens. The lines selected for you in different decision
problems are independent of each other and depend solely upon chance.
The computer program dialog window is shown here. In each round, you will choose an allocation by
using the mouse to move the pointer on the computer screen to the allocation that you wish to choose
(note that the pointer does not need to be precisely on the diagonal line to shift the allocation). When
you are ready to make your decision, left‐click to enter your chosen allocation. After that, confirm your
decision by clicking on the OK button. Note that you can choose only Hold and Pass combinations that
are on the diagonal line. Once you have clicked the OK button, your decision cannot be revised.
After you submit each choice, you will be asked to make another allocation in a different decision
problem involving a different diagonal line representing possible allocations. Again, all decision
problems are independent of each other. This process will be repeated until all 50 decision rounds are
completed. At the end of the last round, you will be informed that the experiment has ended.
Next, you will have a practice decision round. The choices you make in this practice round will have no
impact on the final payoffs to you or to the charity. In this round, you may choose any combination of
tokens to Hold (tokens to you) and Pass (tokens to the charity) that are on the line. To choose an
allocation, use the mouse to move the cursor on the computer screen to the allocation that you desire.
When you are ready to make your practice choice, left‐click to enter your chosen allocation. To revise
your allocation in the first practice round, click the CANCEL button. To confirm your decision, click on the
OK button. You will then be automatically moved to the second practice round. After you complete the
practice round, click NEXT to proceed to the next screen.

Payoffs will be determined as follows: At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select
one of the 50 decisions you made to carry out for real payoffs. You will receive the tokens you held in
that round (the tokens allocated to Hold). Your selected charity will receive the tokens that you passed
(the tokens allocated to Pass). Note that the charity you selected is not making any allocation decisions.
At the end of last round, you will be informed of the round selected for payment, and your choice and
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payment for the round. At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. Each
token will be worth 0.50 dollars, and payoffs will be rounded up to the nearest cent. Recall that you are
free to stop at any time, and you may return to complete the experimental session at any time between
now and 04‐01‐2016. If you do not complete the experiment between now and 04‐01‐2016, neither you
nor your selected charity will receive any payment.
To review, in every decision problem in this experiment, you will be asked to allocate tokens to Hold and
Pass. At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select one of the 50 decision problems
to carry out for payoffs. The round selected depends solely upon chance. You will then receive the
number of tokens you allocated to Hold in the chosen round. The charity you selected will receive the
number of tokens you allocated to Pass in the chosen round. Each token will be worth 50 cents. If
everything is clear, you are ready to start. Please click NEXT to proceed to the actual experiment.
Experiment Screens:

122

123

124

Bibliography
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project,
Inc. 576 U.S. Supreme Court, 2015.
Sidney N Afriat. Efficiency estimation of production functions. International Economic
Review, pages 568–598, 1972.
Joseph G Altonji and Rebecca M Blank. Race and gender in the labor market. Handbook
of labor economics, 3:3143–3259, 1999.
Steffen Andersen, Glenn W Harrison, Morten I Lau, and E Elisabet Rutström. Eliciting risk
and time preferences. Econometrica, 76(3):583–618, 2008.
James Andreoni. Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and ricardian equivalence. The Journal of Political Economy, pages 1447–1458, 1989.
James Andreoni. Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow
giving. The economic journal, 100(401):464–477, 1990.
James Andreoni. An experimental test of the public-goods crowding-out hypothesis. The
American Economic Review, pages 1317–1327, 1993.
James Andreoni and John Miller. Giving according to garp: An experimental test of the
consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica, pages 737–753, 2002.
Kenneth Arrow et al. The theory of discrimination. Discrimination in labor markets, 3(10):
3–33, 1973.
Gary S Becker. The economics of discrimination. University of Chicago press, 1957.
Gary S Becker. A theory of social interactions. Journal of Political Economy, 82(6):1063–
1093, 1974.
Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirole. Incentives and prosocial behavior. The American Economic Review, 96(5):1652–1678, 2006.
Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. Are emily and greg more employable than
lakisha and jamal? a field experiment on labor market discrimination. The American
Economic Review, 94(4):991–1013, 2004.

125

Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 2004.
Marianne Bertrand, Dolly Chugh, and Sendhil Mullainathan. Implicit discrimination. American Economic Review, pages 94–98, 2005.
Alison Booth and Patrick Nolen. Choosing to compete: How different are girls and boys?
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 81(2):542–555, 2012a.
Alison Booth, Lina Cardona Sosa, and Patrick Nolen. Do single-sex classes affect achievement? an experiment in a coeducational university. Technical report, CEPR Discussion
Papers, 2014.
Alison L Booth and Patrick Nolen. Gender differences in risk behaviour: does nurture
matter?*. The Economic Journal, 122(558):F56–F78, 2012b.
Lex Borghans, Angela Lee Duckworth, James J Heckman, and Bas Ter Weel. The economics
and psychology of personality traits. Journal of Human Resources, 43(4):972–1059, 2008.
Tomas Broberg, Tore Ellingsen, and Magnus Johannesson. Is generosity involuntary? Economics Letters, 94(1):32–37, 2007.
Alexander L. Brown, Jonathan Meer, and J. Forrest Williams. Social distance and quality
ratings in charity choice. Working Paper 20182, National Bureau of Economic Research,
May 2014. URL http://www.nber.org/papers/w20182.
Jamie Brown-Kruse and David Hummels. Gender effects in laboratory public goods contribution: Do individuals put their money where their mouth is? Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 22(3):255–267, 1993.
Steve Buchheit and Linda M Parsons. An experimental investigation of accounting informations influence on the individual giving process. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
25(6):666–686, 2006.
Crosby Burns. The costly business of discrimination. Washington: Center for American
Progress, 2012.
T Buser, M Niederle, H Oosterbeek, et al. Gender, competitiveness and career choices. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3):1409–1447, 2014.
C Bram Cadsby and Elizabeth Maynes. Gender and free riding in a threshold public goods
game: experimental evidence. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 34(4):603–
620, 1998.
Colin Camerer. Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton
University Press, 2003.
Anne Campbell. A mind of her own: the evolutionary psychology of women. Oxford University Press, 2002.
126

Juan-Camilo Cárdenas, Anna Dreber, Emma Von Essen, and Eva Ranehill. Gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking: Comparing children in colombia and sweden.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83(1):11–23, 2012.
Marco Castillo and Ragan Petrie. Discrimination in the lab: Does information trump appearance? Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1):50–59, 2010.
World Giving Index, volume 4, dec 2013. Charities Aid Foundation.
Kerwin Kofi Charles and Jonathan Guryan. Studying discrimination: Fundamental challenges and recent progress. Annu. Rev. Econ., 3(1):479–511, 2011.
Kenneth Y Chay, Michael Greenstone, et al. Does air quality matter? evidence from the
housing market. Journal of Political Economy, 113(2):376–424, 2005.
Syngjoo Choi, Raymond Fisman, Douglas Gale, and Shachar Kariv. Consistency and heterogeneity of individual behavior under uncertainty. The American economic review, 97
(5):1921–1938, 2007.
Syngjoo Choi, Shachar Kariv, Wieland Müller, and Dan Silverman. Who is (more) rational?
The American Economic Review, 104(6):1518–1550, 2014.
Jacob Cohen. Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences. Academic press, 2013.
John G Cragg. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to
the demand for durable goods. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages
829–844, 1971.
Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy. Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic
literature, pages 448–474, 2009.
Heidi Crumpler and Philip J Grossman. An experimental test of warm glow giving. Journal
of public Economics, 92(5):1011–1021, 2008.
Jason Dana, Daylian M Cain, and Robyn M Dawes. What you dont know wont hurt me:
Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 100(2):193–201, 2006.
Nabanita Datta Gupta, Anders Poulsen, and Marie Claire Villeval. Gender matching and
competitiveness: Experimental evidence. Economic Inquiry, 51(1):816–835, 2013.
Douglas D Davis, Edward L Millner, and Robert J Reilly. Subsidy schemes and charitable
contributions: a closer look. Experimental economics, 8(2):85–106, 2005.
Stefano DellaVigna, John A List, and Ulrike Malmendier. Testing for altruism and social
pressure in charitable giving. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1):1–56, 2012.
Stefano DellaVigna, John A List, Ulrike Malmendier, Gautam Rao, et al. The importance
of being marginal: Gender differences in generosity. American Economic Review, 103(3):
586–90, 2013.
127

Catherine C Eckel and Philip J Grossman. Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games
and economic behavior, 16(2):181–191, 1996.
Catherine C Eckel and Philip J Grossman. Rebate versus matching: does how we subsidize
charitable contributions matter? Journal of Public Economics, 87(3):681–701, 2003.
Catherine C Eckel and Ragan Petrie. Face value. The American Economic Review, pages
1497–1513, 2011.
Gerald Eisenkopf, Zohal Hessami, Urs Fischbacher, and Heinrich W Ursprung. Academic
performance and single-sex schooling: Evidence from a natural experiment in switzerland.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 115:123–143, 2015.
Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson. Pride and prejudice: The human side of incentive
theory. American Economic Review, 98(3):990–1008, 2008.
Paul J Ferraro and Ronald G Cummings. Cultural diversity, discrimination, and economic
outcomes: an experimental analysis. Economic Inquiry, 45(2):217–232, 2007.
Chaim Fershtman and Uri Gneezy. Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental
approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 351–377, 2001.
Klaus Fiedler and Matthias Bluemke. Faking the iat: Aided and unaided response control on
the implicit association tests. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27(4):307–316, 2005.
Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits. Individual preferences for giving.
The American Economic Review, 97(5):1858–1876, 2007.
Raymond Fisman, Pamela Jakiela, and Shachar Kariv. Distributional preferences and political behavior. 2015.
Jeffrey A Flory, Andreas Leibbrandt, and John A List. Do competitive workplaces deter
female workers? a large-scale natural field experiment on job entry decisions. Review of
economic studies, 82(1):122–155, 2015.
Roland Fryer and S. Levitt. An empirical analysis of the gender gap in mathematics. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, pages 210–240, 2010.
Malcolm Gladwell. Blink: the power of thinking without thinking. Little, Brown and Co.,
2005.
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini. Gender and competition at a young age. The American
Economic Review, 94(2):377–381, 2004.
Uri Gneezy, Muriel Niederle, Aldo Rustichini, et al. Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS-, 118(3):1049–1074, 2003.

128

Uri Gneezy, Kenneth L Leonard, and John A List. Gender differences in competition:
Evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society. Econometrica, 77(5):1637–1664,
2009.
Uri Gneezy, John List, and Michael K Price. Toward an understanding of why people discriminate: Evidence from a series of natural field experiments. Technical report, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 2012.
Jacob K Goeree, Charles A Holt, and Susan K Laury. Private costs and public benefits:
unraveling the effects of altruism and noisy behavior. Journal of public Economics, 83(2):
255–276, 2002.
Teresa P Gordon, Cathryn L Knock, and Daniel G Neely. The role of rating agencies in the
market for charitable contributions: An empirical test. Journal of Accounting and Public
Policy, 28(6):469–484, 2009.
Anthony G Greenwald, Debbie E McGhee, and Jordan LK Schwartz. Measuring individual
differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. Journal of personality and
social psychology, 74(6):1464, 1998.
Anthony G Greenwald, Brian A Nosek, and Mahzarin R Banaji. Understanding and using
the implicit association test: I. an improved scoring algorithm. Journal of personality and
social psychology, 85(2):197, 2003.
Anthony G Greenwald, T Andrew Poehlman, Eric Luis Uhlmann, and Mahzarin R Banaji.
Understanding and using the implicit association test: Iii. meta-analysis of predictive
validity. Journal of personality and social psychology, 97(1):17, 2009.
David M Grether and Charles R Plott. Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal
phenomenon. The American Economic Review, pages 623–638, 1979.
P Grossman, C Eckel, et al. Giving versus taking: a real donation comparison of warm
glow and cold prickle in a context-rich environment. Technical report, Monash University,
Department of Economics, 2012.
Andrew Hanson and Zackary Hawley. Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? evidence from an internet field experiment in us cities. Journal of Urban Economics,
70(2):99–114, 2011.
Andrew Hanson, Zackary Hawley, and Aryn Taylor. Subtle discrimination in the rental
housing market: Evidence from e-mail correspondence with landlords. Journal of Housing
Economics, 20(4):276–284, 2011.
Glenn W. Harrison and Laurie T. Johnson. Identifying Altruism in the Laboratory, chapter 10, pages 177–223. doi: 10.1016/S0193-2306(06)11008-X.
Glenn W Harrison and John A List. Field experiments. Journal of Economic literature, 42
(4):1009–1055, 2004.
129

Glenn W Harrison and Richard D Phillips. Subjective beliefs and statistical forecasts of
financial risks: The chief risk officer project. 2013.
J Heckman. Sample specification bias as a selection error. Econometrica, 47(1):153–162,
1979.
James J Heckman. Detecting discrimination. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, pages
101–116, 1998.
Charles A Holt and Susan K Laury. Risk aversion and incentive effects. American economic
review, 92(5):1644–1655, 2002.
Steffen Huck, Imran Rasul, and Andrew Shephard. Comparing charitable fundraising
schemes: Evidence from a natural field experiment and a structural model. American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7(2):326–69, May 2015. doi: 10.1257/pol.20120312.
Johnnie EV Johnson and Philip L Powell. Decision making, risk and gender: Are managers
different? British Journal of Management, 5(2):123–138, 1994.
John T Jost, Laurie A Rudman, Irene V Blair, Dana R Carney, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack
Glaser, and Curtis D Hardin. The existence of implicit bias is beyond reasonable doubt:
A refutation of ideological and methodological objections and executive summary of ten
studies that no manager should ignore. Research in organizational behavior, 29:39–69,
2009.
Jerry Kang. Implicit bias: A primer for courts. National Center for State Courts, 2009.
Peter Kuhn and Marie Claire Villeval. Are women more attracted to co-operation than men?
The Economic Journal, 125(582):115–140, 2015.
Edward P Lazear, Ulrike Malmendier, and Roberto A Weber. Sorting in experiments with
application to social preferences. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(1):
136–163, 2012.
Daniel J. Lee. Risk aversion and implicit bias. Mimeo.
Andreas Leibbrandt and John A List. Do women avoid salary negotiations? evidence from
a large-scale natural field experiment. Management Science, 61(9):2016–2024, 2014.
John A List. The nature and extent of discrimination in the marketplace: Evidence from
the field. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 49–89, 2004.
Sara Lowes, Nathan Nunn, James A Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel. Understanding ethnic
identity in africa: Evidence from the implicit association test (iat). American Economic
Review, 105(5):340–45, 2015.
Evelyn A McDowell, Wei Li, and Pamela C Smith. An experimental examination of us
individual donors information needs and use. Financial Accountability & Management, 29
(3):327–347, 2013.
130

Adam W Meade. Freeiat: An open-source program to administer the implicit association
test. Applied psychological measurement, 33(8):643–643, 2009.
James Mill. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, volume 1. London: Longmans,
Green, Reader and Dyer, 1869.
David Neumark. Detecting discrimination in audit and correspondence studies. Journal of
Human Resources, 47(4):1128–1157, 2012.
Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund. Do women shy away from competition? do men
compete too much? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pages 1067–1101, 2007.
Muriel Niederle and Lise Vesterlund. Gender and competition. Annu. Rev. Econ., 3(1):
601–630, 2011.
Michael I Norton, Malia F Mason, Joseph A Vandello, Andrew Biga, and Rebecca Dyer.
An fmri investigation of racial paralysis. Social cognitive and affective neuroscience, page
nss010, 2012.
Brian A Nosek and Jeffrey J Hansen. The associations in our heads belong to us: Searching
for attitudes and knowledge in implicit evaluation. Cognition & Emotion, 22(4):553–594,
2008.
Brian A Nosek, Mahzarin Banaji, and Anthony G Greenwald. Harvesting implicit group
attitudes and beliefs from a demonstration web site. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research,
and Practice, 6(1):101, 2002.
Hessel Oosterbeek and Reyn Van Ewijk. Gender peer effects in university: Evidence from a
randomized experiment. Economics of Education Review, 38:51–63, 2014.
Hyunjoon Park, Jere R Behrman, and Jaesung Choi. Causal effects of single-sex schools on
college entrance exams and college attendance: Random assignment in seoul high schools.
Demography, 50(2):447–469, 2013.
Ragan Petrie and Carmit Segal. Gender differences in competitiveness: The role of prizes.
Available at SSRN 2520052, 2014.
Edmund S Phelps. The statistical theory of racism and sexism. The american economic
review, pages 659–661, 1972.
Solomon William Polachek. Occupational self-selection: A human capital approach to sex
differences in occupational structure. The review of Economics and Statistics, pages 60–69,
1981.
Joseph Price and Justin Wolfers. Racial discrimination among nba referees. The Quarterly
journal of economics, 125(4):1859–1887, 2010.
Ernesto Reuben, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. How stereotypes impair womens careers
in science. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(12):4403–4408, 2014.
131

Ernesto Reuben, Matthew Wiswall, and Basit Zafar. Preferences and biases in educational
choices and labour market expectations: Shrinking the black box of gender. The Economic
Journal, 2015.
Motoko Rich. Old tactic gets new use: Public schools separate girls and boys. New York
Times, page A14, Dec 2014.
Dan-Olof Rooth. Automatic associations and discrimination in hiring: Real world evidence.
Labour Economics, 17(3):523–534, 2010.
Bradley J Ruffle and Richard Sosis. Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: A field
test on israeli kibbutz members and city residents. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 60(2):147–163, 2006.
Robert Slonim and Pablo Guillen. Gender selection discrimination: Evidence from a trust
game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 76(2):385–405, 2010.
John L Solow and Nicole Kirkwood. Group identity and gender in public goods experiments.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48(4):403–412, 2002.
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